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A  Criticism  of  Some  Deterministic 

Systems  in  Their  Relation  to 

Practical  Problems 


I  ESSE    HERRMANN 


A  Criticism  of  Some  Deterministic 

Systems  in  Their  Relation  to 

Practical  Problems 


A  DISSERTATION 

presented  to  the 

Faculty  of  Princeton  University 

IN  Candidacy  for  the  Degree 

OF  Doctor  of  Philosophy 


BY 

JESSE   HERRMANN 


PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 
PRINCETON 

LONDON:  HUMPHREY  MILFORD 

OXFORD  university  PRESS 

1914 


Published  October,  1914 


.  •  •     • 


■•'. :  ■-• 


CONTENTS 

I.  INTRODUCTORY  3 

II.  THEORY  AND  PRACTICE  14 

III.  NATURALISM   21 

IV.  THEOLOGICAL  DETERMINISM   39 

V.  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  SELF 49 

VI.  CONCLUSION    57 


2^^713 


I     INTRODUCTORY 

One  of  the  functions  of  philosophy  is  to  synthetize  the  sum 
total  of  knowledge.  But  it  must  be  remembered  that  philoso- 
phy in  its  essence  is  not  an  amanuensis,  a  tabulator  or  a 
reflector.  Its  enunciation  is  more  important  than  its  formula- 
tion ;  as  a  vitalizer  it  is  more  efficacious  than  as  a  systematizer. 
Even  though  the  philosopher  receives  his  content  from  the 
thought  and  the  normal  activity  of  the  masses,  yet  he  stands 
on  a  unique  pinnacle  and  becomes  the  true  prophet  and  leader 
of  his  age.  True  philosophy  always  eventuates  in  practical 
consequences.  Plato's  Republic  is  speculative  to  the  highest 
degree,  yet  no  one  can  deny  that  his  ideas  have  had  a  marked 
material  influence  wherever  Greek  culture  has  penetrated. 
Stoic  philosophic  thought,  in  a  way  easily  traceable,  became 
the  formative  principle  underlying  much  Roman  jurisprudence. 
Among  the  speculative  religious  thinkers  the  classic  example 
is  found  in  John  Calvin.  He  blazed  a  new  trail  in  religious 
thought.  The  results  of  his  rule  in  Geneva  can  be  measured, 
but  who  can  compute  the  practical  consequences  in  education, 
sociology  and  politics  that  his  bold  and  daring  conception  pro- 
duced? In  the  eyes  of  many  Fichte  was  a  dreamer  and  a 
spinner  of  metaphysical  webs,  but  he  became  the  man  of  the 
hour  when  Germany  needed  practical  and  resourceful  men. 
There  are  exceptional  men  in  public  life  to-day  who  have  never 
found  an  hiatus  between  the  retreat  of  the  scholar  and  the 
work  of  the  world. 

There  is  no  necessary  conflict  between  theory  and  practice. 
The  successful  financier,  social  worker,  or  inventor  who  ignores 
the  work  of  the  speculative  thinker  is  as  ignorant  and  biased 
as  the  pseudo-philosopher  who  has  lost  sympathy  with  the 
doer,  and  who  often  despises  the  day  and  the  man  of  small 
things.  The  Greek  geometricians  out  of  pure  love  of  knowl- 
edge patiently  investigated  the  conic  sections,  but  they 
never  dreamed  to  what  purposes  a  Newton  would  apply  their 
conclusions. 

Still  the  criticism  of  the  philosopher  has  not  always  been 


Ai  ^ 


.CRITjaSM   OF   DETERMINISM 


unmerited.  To  this  day  metaphysics  has  not  recovered  from 
the  sins  of  its  fruitlessness  in  the  Middle  Ages.  The  Renais- 
sance with  its  new  interest  in  science  and  in  man,  apart  from 
rehgious  considerations,  became  keenly  conscious  of  the  worth- 
lessness  of  certain  types  of  speculative  thought.  The  new 
school  did  not  hesitate  to  press  its  point  of  vantage  and  the 
old  philosophy  was  brought  into  thorough  disrepute.  But 
philosophy  learned  its  lesson  well,  and  it  has  guarded  its 
systems  with  a  jealous  eye  so  that  they  should  never  again 
degenerate  into  mere  sesquipedalian  verbiage.  With  the  excep- 
tion of  a  few  thinkers  modern  philosophy  has  remained  true 
to  her  high  purpose,  and  has  rigorously  insisted  that  the 
terminus  ad  quern  is  nothing  less  than  contact  with  human  life. 

♦  *    But  in  spite  of  all  this  philosophy  has  not  escaped  criticism 

*  and  calumny  at  the  instance  of  the  scientific  and  business  world. 

•  The  scientist,  allied  with  a  materialistic  psychology,  claims  that 
♦philosophy  arrogates  too  much  to  itself  when  it  proceeds  to 

♦  synthetize  the  data  furnished  by  the  sciences  and  claims  to  have 
•found  a  final  word  or  a  new  whole  which  can  not  be  equated 
^to  the  sum  of  its  parts.     In  a  similar  way,  though  with  a 

different  purpose,  the  over  confident  devotees  of  so-called 
practical  life  have  sought  to  undermine  philosophy  in  the  nine- 
teenth and  twentieth  centuries.  Man  has  discovered  more 
keys  to  unlock  the  store-house  of  nature's  power  in  the  last  two 
centuries  than  our  progenitors  had  discovered  in  a  millennium. 
An  undue  excess  of  creature  comforts  has  lulled  the  masses  to 
sleep.  The  world  of  appreciation  and  value  has  been  relegated 
to  the  limbo  of  uncertainty  and  unreality.  The  individuals  in 
the  nation,  riveting  their  gaze  on  the  same  object,  have  become 
hypnotized ;  they  press  forward  with  lowered  head  confident  of 
their  self-sufficiency  and  power.  They  are  deaf  to  the  voice 
of  the  poet,  the  preacher  and  the  philosopher,  the  champions 
of  truth. 

Many  signs  can  be  adduced  which  are  indubitable  proofs  of 
this  condition.  Just  as  an  individual  cannot  think  and  work 
at  the  same  time,  so  a  nation  cannot  construct  railroads, 
develop  mines,  build  factories  and  cultivate  the  soil  and  at  the 
same  time  produce  poetry,  art,  and  music.  To  the  student  of 
history  it  is  not  strange  that  America,  in  her  brief  childhood 
days,  has  produced  no  immortal  art.  And  if  the  fine  arts  thus 
far  have  not   found  congenial  soil  in   American  civilization,. 


INTRODUCTORY  5 

much  less  has  philosophy  found  a  hearing.  It  is  no  mystery 
that  the  busy  world  should  take  little  stock  in  the  sober  thought 
of  the  secluded  scholar.  The  man  engaged  with  the  concrete 
thought  and  act  has  neither  time  nor  inclination  for  much 
abstract  thinking.  But  even  the  busiest  man  and  the  busiest 
nation  love  to  flatter  themselves  that  they  are  philosophers  or 
at  least  that  they  are  on  speaking  terms  with  men  who  know 
and  make  philosophy.  When  they  cannot  find  a  system  to 
their  taste  they  begin  to  make  a  W eltanschammg  to  their 
own  liking.  No  better  illustration  is  afforded  of  this  tendency 
than  the  pragmatism  prevalent  in  our  own  day.  This  seculari- 
zation of  philosophy  is  fraught  with  as  many  dangers  to  the 
intellectual  life  as  the  secularization  of  the  church  is  fraught 
with  perils  to  the  religious  life.  But  this  is  exactly  what* 
pragmatic  thought  indicates.  We  must  get  our  norms  fromi 
the  mart  and  the  stock  exchange. 

But   no   civilization    can    long   continue   in    the   course   of  ' 
material  prosperity  and  concrete  thought  without  eventually  • 
developing  the  most  portentous  problems.    An  unpremeditated  * 
movement  must  eventuate  in  some  such  way.     Suddenly  a   • 
halt  is  made  and  the  individual  becomes  self-conscious.    When  • 
this  self-consciousness  comes  to  the  masses  a  great  upheaval  • 
follows  the  restless  discontent.     The  people  look  on  all  sides    * 
for  light  and  leadership.    It  is  then  that  the  demagogue  has  his 
opportunity,   for  conditions  are  in  unstable  equilibrium,  and 
the  slightest  impact  may  precipitate  the  social  consciousness 
into  stern  fixity.    But  this  malleable  situation  also  receives  the 
arduous  attention  of  sincere  reformers  who  are  not  qualified  by 
training  or  temperament  to  reform  the  social  structure.    Thus 
the  market  is  flooded  with  ready-made  nostrums  and  panaceas 
for  every  ill.    This  crucial  situation  also  furnishes  the  golden 
opportunity    for   the   philosopher,    the   man   of    reason,    true 
insight,  and  discernment. 

The  most  pronounced  feature  of  the  last  two  decades  of 
our  history  has  been  its  transitional  character.  A  strange  sense 
of  insecurity  and  dissatisfaction  pervades  every  department  of 
life.  Witness  the  disruption  in  present  political  allegiance ;  the 
revulsion  from  creed  and  dogma  in  religion.  These  facts  indi- 
cate that  the  old  order  is  passing  away  and  that  a  new  align- 
ment must  be  made.  The  new  modus  vivendi  demands  a  new 
modus  operandi.     The  work  of  reconstruction  has  begun  and 


6  CRITICISM  OF  DETERMINISM 

it  is  imperative  to  inquire  whether  the  plan  of  the  work  is 
based  on  sound  principles. 

Broadly  speaking,  there  are  two  distinct  ways  in  which  a 
society  may  rehabilitate  itself  and  its  members.  The  first  is 
the  internal  or  dynamic ;  the  second  is  the  external  or  mechanic. 
The  former  seeks  to  change  the  environment  by  changing  the 
individual,  the  latter  tries  to  change  the  individual  by  changing 
his  environment.  These  two  strands  can  be  clearly  detected  in 
the  history  of  politics,  philosophy  and  theology. 

The  true  defenders  of  the  crown  in  all  ages  sincerely  believe 
that  the  good  of  the  people,  the  progress  of  the  race  and  the 
advancement  of  civilization  can  be  secured  only  by  creating,  as 
it  were,  ab  extra  conditions,  laws,  and  environment,  which  will 

•  in  turn  penetrate  the  social  fabric  and  renovate  the  individual 
.member.    The  champions  of  constitutional  government,  on  the 

other  hand,  maintain  that  true  progress  results  only  when  the 
individual,  motivated  by  self  respect  and  a  high  ideal,  projects 
himself  spontaneously  into  his  outer  relations,  and  thus  creates 
the  laws  and  conditions  which  obtain  in  the  community  in 
which  he  lives.  History  clearly  teaches  that  the  latter  concep- 
tion is  the  true  theory  of  the  state. 

•  In  philosophy  the  conflict  has  been  mainly  between  the 
^idealists  and  the  naturalists.  At  all  times  the  idealists  have 
.been  eloquent  in  asserting  the  centrality  of  selfhood.  The 
^periphery  has  significance  only  as  it  finds  its  way  back  to  the 
^center.    Not  only  do  all  human  relations,  social,  economic  and 

•  political,  get  their  significance  from  these  self-centers,  but 
*even  nature  and  her  laws  are  dependent  on  the  self.  Man  is 
'  not  the  child  of  nature ;  rather  say  that  nature  is  man's  ward. 

The  naturalist,  on  the  other  hand,  begins  with  the  external 
world  in  its  larger  proportions.  He  places  the  accent  on  phe- 
nomena, and  with  great  difficulty  he  ultimately  finds  the  insig- 
nificant creature  called  man.  He  studies  him  with  the  aid  of 
a  microscope,  but  finds  only  chemical  compounds,  atomic 
motion,  nerve  energy,  and  reflex  arcs.     Man  is  no  more  a 

•  mystery  to  him  than  the  crystallization  of  a  diamond.  At  any 
V  moment  of  time  he  is  the  effect  of  the  sum-total  of  antecedents 
N  which  obtain  in  the  causal  nexus  of  which  he  happens  to  be  a 
"*part.     To  him  conduct  is  composed  of   the  same  calculable 

♦components  that  explain  the  path  of  a  moving  body.  To  get 
I  any  definite  reaction,  it  is  only  necessary  to  provide  the  appro- 


INTRODUCTORY  7 

priate  external  stimulus.  Provide  the  right  stimuli  and  the  * 
man  will  turn  out  good  deeds,  sweet  music,  as  well  as  the  • 
daily  routine.  According  to  this  position  nature  makes  man  • 
and  not  man  nature. 

These  two  threads  are  no  less  distinct  in  theology  than  they 
are   in   politics   and   philosophy.      In   most   religions,   and   in 
Christianity  in  particular,  there  has  appeared   the  antinomy 
between  priestism  and  prophetism,  between  ritualism  and  vital- 
ism, between  ceremony  and  sincerity.     In  a  most  singular  way 
the  priest  class  and  the  prophet  class  flourished  in  the  same 
religious  economy  in  the  Hebrew  state.    Their  ideals  and  work 
were  distinct  and  often  seemed  contradictory.    The  priest  was  % 
concerned  with  the  jot  and  the  tittle  of  the  law.    He  impressed  * 
on  every  member  the  necessity  of  conforming  to  the  external* 
rites  in  order  that  his  present  and  future  condition  might  be 
secure.     From  birth  to  death  the  Jew  was  circumscribed  by  a  * 
law  and  order  superimposed  from  without.     Only  by  rigor-  • 
ously  adhering  to  every  precept  of  the  law  could  he  attain  the  • 
ideal  existence.     The  message  of  the  prophet  had  an  entirely* 
different  content.     An  Amos  or  an  Isaiah  towers  above  his   • 
fellows  as  a  man  who  saw  things  in  truer  proportion ;  who  had  • 
communed  with   God  and  with  himself,   and  thus   felt  very  • 
deeply  the  distinction  between  religious  form  and  religious  life.  • 
In    their   estimate   religion   must   make    form   and    not    form  • 
religion.      The    following    passages    strongly    emphasize    the    - 
prophet's   protest   against   the   extreme   liturgies   of   his   day.    • 
^'Create  in  me  a  clean  heart,  O  God,  and  renew  a  right  spirit 
within  me.     For  thou  delightest  not  in  sacrifice;  else  would  • 
I   give   it :     Thou   hast   no  pleasure  in   burnt-offering.      The  • 
sacrifices  of  God  are  a  broken  spirit :  a  broken  and  a  contrite  • 
heart,  O  God,  thou  will  not  despise."^    Or  think  for  a  moment  • 
of  the  high  conception  of  the  prophet  Micah.     "Wherewith  - 
shall  I  come  before  Jehovah,  and  bow  myself  before  the  high  • 
God?     Shall   I  come  before  him   with  burnt-offerings,   with  • 
calves  a  year  old?  .  .  .  He  hath  showed  thee,  O  man,  what  * 
is  good;  and  what  doth  Jehovah  require  of  thee,  but  to  do  * 
justly  and  to   love  kindness  and  to   walk  humbly   with   thy  * 
God."^     This  perennial  conflict  in  the  Jewish  state  came  to  a   • 
final  issue  in  the  teachings  and  work  of  Jesus  and  Paul.    These 

^  Psalm  51  :io,  16,  17. 
^  Micah  6:6,  8. 


8  CRITICISM  OF  DETERMINISM 

two  masters  found  no  comparable  foes  among  the  Pharisees 
and  the  Sadducees.  The  strife  was  long  but  the  outcome  de- 
cisive. The  obstinacy  of  the  ritualists  culminated  in  the  com- 
plete disruption  of  the  Jewish  commonwealth.  It  was  a  great 
victory  for  the  principle  of  internalism.  At  the  very  beginning 
of  Christianity  the  proposition  was  clearly  set  forth  that  man 
was  to  be  regenerated  from  within  and  not  from  without.  A 
new  spirit  was  instilled  into  the  heart  of  man  and  not  a  new 
shackle  placed  upon  his  hand. 

It  might  have  been  expected  that  Christianity,  founded  on 
a  strictly  spiritualistic  basis  and  nurtured  by  men  who  were 
loyal  to  this  principle,  would  have  dealt  a  death  blow  to  the 
idea  that  man  lives  by  bread  alone.  But  history  speaks  to  the 
contrary.  The  ghost  of  the  Jewish  nation  was  reincarnated  in 
the  Christian  body.  Here  is  found  a  significant  illustration  of 
the  cyclical  nature  of  history.  As  soon  as  the  Roman  Church 
began  to  flourish  the  old  conflict  was  again  at  hand.  Chris- 
tianity became  more  and  more  formal  and  ritualistic;  religion 
was  often  conceived  as  a  commercial  transaction.  But  there  were 
never  wanting  individual  champions  of  a  true  heart-religion. 
Space  does  not  permit  even  to  mention  the  salient  facts  in  this 
century-long  conflict.  Such  names  as  Gottschalk,  Savonarola, 
Huss,  Zwingle,  Calvin,  Knox  and  Luther  are  eloquent  even  in 
their  silence.  The  climax  came  at  the  time  of  the  Reformation ; 
but  unlike  the  Jewish  controversy  the  contest  was  not  decisive. 
The  Jewish  nation  paid  the  penalty  of  death,  the  Roman 
hierarchy  lost  many  members  and  much  prestige.  The  conflict 
between  the  Romanists  and  the  Protestants  to-day  is  essentially 
one  of  method  and  process  in  the  regeneration  of  man. 

It  must  be  evident  that  the  above  discussion  has  not  been  a 
digression  from  the  point  at  issue.  The  problem  is  to  find  the 
true  method  of  procedure  in  the  reconstruction  of  our  life 
and  thought.  There  are  two  possible  lines  that  may  lead  to  a 
solution.  It  has  been  observed  that  in  all  ages  and  in  most 
realms  of  life  there  have  been  two  parties  contending  for 
supremacy.  It  may  be  of  little  import  to  decide  which  has 
scored  most  victories;  it  is  sufficient  to  know  that  the  strife  is 
perennial. 

In  reviewing  once  more  the  social  and  political  tendencies  of 
the  day,  it  is  evident  that  the  externalistic,  the  collectivistic 
reconstruction  is  most  prominent.     In  respect  to  faith  in  the 


INTRODUCTORY  9 

omnipotence  of  legislation  many  of  our  statesmen  out-Bentham, 
Bentham.  The  Allmacht  of  law  is  as  axiomatic  to  many  people 
as  the  law  of  gravitation.  The  following  statements  by  Prof. 
George  B.  McClellan  bring  out  this  thought  in  bold  relief : 

*'Men  have  achieved  a  notoriety  which  their  admirers  have 
believed  to  be  fame,  for  no  better  reason  than  that  they  have 
been  instrumental  in  the  enactment  of  statutes  designed  to 
abolish  most  forms  of  sin  by  the  mere  decree  that  they  shall 
cease  to  exist." 

"Despite  this,  year  after  year,  our  Congress  and  our  Legisla- 
tures, with  a  perseverance  and  an  energy  worthy  of  a  better 
cause,  enact  statutes  by  the  thousand,  all  designed  with  the  best 
will  in  the  world,  to  bring  us  a  little  nearer  to  perfection,  and 
all  due  to  the  prevalent  impression  that  any  statute  will  cer- 
tainly accomplish  the  good  intended  by  its  authors." 

*'The  extreme  of  paternaHsm  was  reached  in  the  Hepburn 
Pure  Food  Act,  which  subjects  all  foods,  drugs  and  drinks, 
including  wines,  liquors  and  milk,  to  government  analysis, 
government  regulation  and  government  inspection.  The 
National  Government,  in  other  words,  undertakes  through  its 
power  to  regulate  commerce  between  the  States  to  secure  the 
citizen  a  wholesome  breakfast,  an  eatable  dinner,  a  sound  glass  • 
of  champagne  and  a  pure  drink  of  whiskey.""* 

The  inquiry  now  is  concerning  the  cause  and  the  significance 
of  the  fact  that  men  are  surrounded  by  a  network  of  mechan- 
ical laws,  which  do  not  emanate  from  the  social  consciousness. 
Why  treat  man  like  a  machine?  Why  seek  his  good  as  we  seek 
the  good  of  an  acre  of  land? 

As  to  its  significance  few  will  deny  that  it  is  fraught  with  • 
the  greatest  dangers.  There  is  imminent  peril  that  man  will  * 
degenerate  into  an  artificially  nurtured  creature;  that  he  will  * 
lose  his  initiative  and  creative  impulse.  Man  can  no  more 
develop  on  moral  and  legal  crutches  than  the  plant  or  animal  • 
can  that  leans  for  support  on  a  ready-made  environment.  The  * 
very  essence  of  life  and  growth  is  that  the  living  entity  persists  • 
not  only  in  spite  of  its  environment  but  that,  in  a  very  specific  • 
even  if  only  in  a  limited  sense,  it  creates  a  new  environment.      • 

The  twining  herbs  of  the  Cuscuta  genus  at  the  inception  of 
life  have  all  the  characteristics  of  strong  independent  organ- 
isms.   They  seem  potentially  endowed  to  maintain  their  integ- 

^  Principles  in  Politics,  pp.  6,  67. 


10  CRITICISM  OF  DETERMINISM 

rity.  They  give  promise  of  better  things.  But  they  evidently 
grow  weary  in  well  doing.  They  send  out  suckers  and  draw 
their  sustenance,  from  the  sap  of  other  plants.  The  adult 
dodder  has  neither  root  nor  leaf  of  its  own.  It  has  hardly 
strength  enough  to  support  the  weight  of  its  own  frail  stem. 
When  the  plant  ceases  to  change  the  inorganic  into  the  organic 
it  no  longer  remains  sui  generis.  The  parisitical  sin  is  to  permit 
'other'  to  change  'self  without  'self  changing  'other'.  What  is 
true  in  the  vegetable  realm  is  equally  true  in  animal  life. 
Nature  has  provided  the  ordinary  crab  with  a  good  armor  plate 
to  protect  himself  against  the  buffeting  of  the  sea  and  the 
attacks  of  his  enemies.  This  means  of  self -protection  is 
nature's  reward  for  long  generations  of  faithful  work.  But 
the  progenitors  of  the  hermit  crab  somehow  conceived  the 
notion  that  nature  could  be  improved.  They  then  began  to 
appropriate  as  implements  of  defense  the  cast  off  weapons  of 
other  mollusks.  For  generations  this  practice  continued,  and 
the  result  is  that  the  hermit  crustacean  has  only  a  thin  mem- 
brane and  articulated  appendages  that  are  atrophied  and  rudi- 
mentary, where  his  more  faithful  brother  has  a  solid  integument 
with  strong  and  fully  developed  limbs. 

•  The  experience  of  man  has  not  been  otherwise.    The  philos- 

•  ophy  or  religion  that  has  helped  man  to  find  himself  has  truly 
♦-helped  him  to  find  God  and  the  world.     The  political,  social 

•  and  economic  orders,  that  have  placed  a  high  worth  on  the 
♦individual,  have  not  only  benefited  the  individual  but  have  in 
•turn  raised  the  standard  of  the  political,  social  and  economic 
'orders  in  which  the  individual  has  thus  been  honored.  The 
•charity  that  aids  men  to  aid  themselves  is  commendable,  but 
•the  charity  that  seeks  only  to  change  the  environment,  thus 
•hoping  to  change  the  character,  is  based  on  a  false  principle. 

The  cause  of  our  mechanized  and  legalized  society  is  un- 
doubtedly a  more  intricate  problem  than  the  study  of  its  signifi- 
cance. To  ascertain  the  real  physical  cause  in  a  phenomenon 
of  nature  is  difficult  enough,  but  it  is  almost  presumptuous  to 
speak  dogmatically  about  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect  in  a 
phenomenon  of  social  life.  The  question  may  be  somewhat 
clarified  by  distinguishing  at  the  outset  between  the  antecedent 
conditions  that  merely  obtain  and  the  causes  that  exist  as 
efficient  antecedents.  That  there  is  a  distinct  difference  between 
the  two  becomes  evident  after  a  moment's  reflection.     Much 


INTRODUCTORY  II 

explanatory  and  descriptive  matter  is  confusing  because  these 
two  concepts  are  interchangeably  used.  For  example,  space  is 
a  condition  of  the  material  world,  but  in  no  sense  is  space  the 
cause  of  this  existence.  Time  is  a  condition  of  a  moving  par- 
ticle but  it  is  not  a  cause  of  motion.  Sin  is  a  condition  of 
saintliness,  but  it  has  never  produced  a  saint. 

What  then  are  the  conditions  and  the  causes  of  the  patern- 
alistic tendency  in  church,  state  and  social  life?  In  this  con- 
nection I  again  quote  Prof.  George  B.  McClellan : 

"The  three  causes  to  which  may  be  traced  the  origin  of  the 
collectivist  tendency  of  the  present  day  all  began  during  the 
era  of  Benthamism;  they  were,  first,  a  general  belief  in  the 
efficacy  of  legislation  to  accomplish  anything  that  its  authors 
may  desire;  second,  economic  development  resulting  in  the 
organization  of  corporations,  which  carried  a  popular  demand 
for  their  regulation;  third,  the  growth  and  power  of  the  labor 
movement."* 

It  appears  that  none  of  the  three  so-called  causes  are  causes 
in  the  true  sense.  ''A  general  belief  in  the  efficacy  of  legisla- 
tion" is  practically  the  same  as  a  general  belief  in  a  ''collectiv- 
ist tendency."  Neither  explains  the  other;  both  must  find  their 
raison  d'etre  elsewhere.  One  is  no  more  the  cause  of  the 
other  than  one  side  of  an  algebraic  equation  is  the  cause  of  the 
other  side.  As  to  corporations  and  labor  organizations,  it  seems 
that  cause  and  condition  are  confused.  The  new  economic 
phenomena  here  instanced  are  part  of  the  assemblage  of  condi- 
tions under  which  the  paternalistic  spirit  began  to  operate,  but 
observe  that  this  same  spirit  is  evident  in  our  social,  religious 
and  educational  reconstruction,  quite  independent  of  corpora- 
tions and  labor  unions.  Therefore  it  is  manifest  that  a  strict 
causal  relation  does  not  obtain  between  these  new  economic 
conditions  and  the  collectivistic  faith.  The  trust  and  labor 
problem  may  have  occasioned  much  legislation,  but  in  no  sense 
does  this  fact  causally  explain  why  there  is  implicit  faith  in 
paternalism. 

These  same  economic  facts  which  have  conditioned  such  a 
luxurious  harvest  of  legislation  have  been  designated  by  Prof. 
Frank  A.  Fetter  as  the  ''Dynamic  condition  of  American  indus- 
tries." For  centuries  adjustment  and  adaptation  have  been 
going  on  in  European  civilization.     The  social,  religious  and 

^Ibid.,  pp.  57,  58. 


12  CRITICISM  OF  DETERMINISM 

political  grooves  have  been  worn  deep  by  the  imperceptible 
passage  of  time.  It  requires  almost  a  catastrophe  to  change 
the  configuration  in  any  department  of  life.  Tradition  and 
custom  exist  in  such  an  atmosphere  as  tenacious  conservative 
forces.  In  our  civilization  on  the  other  hand  most  social  and 
economic  factors  are  in  unstable  equilibrium.  The  fertile  soil, 
vast  stores  of  mineral  deposits,  virgin  forests,  water  power, 
coupled  with  the  invention  of  the  steamboat,  the  steam  locomo- 
tive, and  new  methods  of  mining  and  manufacturing  have 
made  the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  truly  dynamic. 
Every  object  to  which  man  turned;  his  attention  was  found 
pulsating  with  energy.  But  power  does  not  only  mean  oppor- 
tunity, it  also  spells  danger.  In  this  period  all  the  dangers  have 
been  encountered  to  which  a  virile  youth  is  subject  whom  over 
indulgent  parents  have  supplied  too  lavishly  with  ready  cash. 
These  conditions  made  it  imperative  that  many  legitimate  safe- 
guards should  be  enacted  in  order  to  preserve  the  nation  as 
well  as  the  individual.  At  least  a  modicum  of  success  can  be 
traced  to  this  method  of  procedure.  But  the  men  of  the 
twentieth  century,  over  emphasizing  this  success,  have  assumed 
as  axiomatic  that  the  more  life  is  protected  by  the  strong 
pinions  of  the  law  the  safer  our  commonwealth  will  be. 

Having  now  pointed  out  the  conditions  which  have  occa- 
sioned the  unquestionable  faith  in  paternalism,  it  becomes 
necessary  in  the  next  place  to  penetrate  a  little  deeper  and  try 
to  ascertain  the  fundamental  causes,  which  suggest  external 
remedies  for  conditions  as  above  outlined,  and  why  we  clutch 
so  tenaciously  at  this  method  of  reconstruction.  The  answer 
to  these  questions  briefly  stated  is  as  follows : 

Both  naturalism  and  theological  determinism  have  conspired 

*  to  rob  man  of  the  reality  of  selfhood  and  of  his  true  relation  to 

•  God.  The  former  makes  him  a  physical  automaton ;  the  latter 
,a  spiritual  automaton.  These  two  systems,  in  a  very  subtle  and 
•silent  way,  have  dominated  our  thought,  and  have  been  forma- 
•tive  principles  in  the  solution  of  every  problem.  Here  is 
^ound  the  true  cause  of  the  externalistic  method  of  dealing  with 

•new  conditions.  Between  the  two  conceptions,  that/man  is 
#only  a  play  thing  in  the  ruthless  hands  of  a  cold  atomistic 

•  world,  or  the  helpless  clay  fashioned  by  a  creative  potter,  little 

♦  room  is  left  to  man  for  self-initiation  and  self-creation./ If  man 

*  is  what  these  two  apparently  contradictory  and  yet  in  a  sense 


INTRODUCTORY 


13 


converging  W eltanschauungen  appear  to  make  him,  it  is  no 
longer  a  mystery  why  we  seek  to  influence  him  solely  by  ex- 
ternal means, — why  man  has  degenerated  into  a  parasite  instead 
of  maintaining  his  integrity  as  the  acme  of  nature,  and  the 
consummation  of  God's  creative  work. 

At  this  stage  of  the  discussion  my  position  must  necessarily 
be   set    forth   in   dogmatic   and   aphoristic   statements.     It   is 
hoped,   however,   that   dogma  will  give  way   to   reason,   and 
aphorism  to  elucidation  as  tho  study  continues, 
^^n  Genesis  i  -ay  we  read :  "And  God  created  man  in  His  own 
image,  in  the  image  of  God  created  He  him."    Whatever  else 
this  statement  means,  for  me  it  signifies  that  God  gave  man  not 
only   discursive   intelligence,   and  moral   intuition  but   also   a 
will,  which  like  His  own  has  the  power  of  self -initiation  and 
self-activity.     Each  self-conscious  volition  has  an  element  of  • 
absolute  newness   in  it.     It  makes   the  world  other   than   it  • 
would  have  been,  had  not  the  creative  self  put  forth  an  effort.  * 
In  this  sense  creation  is  continually  going  on;  in  this  sense  a 
part  of  God's  world  is  realized  only  through  man.     In  this 
conception  is  found  the  secret  of  man's  real  worth./^ 

The  havoc  results  not  so  much  from  the  fact  that  the  law 
maker,  the  reformer  and  the  pulpiteer  are  unmindful  of  these 
principles  as  from  the  fact  that  the  rank  and  file  are  not  con- 
scious of  their  own  unique  powers.  In  the  last  analysis  it  is 
the  sum-total  of  conviction  and  appreciation,  as  created  by  the 
many  individual  consciousnesses  and  finding  embodiment  in  the 
genius,  that  marks  the  way  for  progress  and  the  attainment  of 
new  truth.  The  mass-thought  makes  the  master,  and  in  turn 
the  master  moulds  the  mass-thought.  This  mutual  relation  and 
interaction  obtains  in  all  progress. 

What  we  then  need  is  not  more  constraint  but  more  convic- 
tion; more  self-appraisement  in  the  nobler  sense.  Legislation 
and  restriction  are  not  unnecessary  but  these  fetters  must  be 
self-imposed  by  a  consciousness  working  from  within  outward 
and  not  from  without  inward.  The  greatest  work  that  the 
philosopher  can  perform  to-day  is  to  apprise  man  of  his  true 
nature.  To  do  this  it  is  imperative  to  free  him  from  the  de- 
grading trammels  of  naturalism  and  the  lofty  slavery  of  theo- 
logical determinism.  To  this  task  of  liberation  we  shall  soon 
turn. 


II     THEORY  AND  PRACTICE 

Before  we  proceed  to  the  critical  examination  of  naturalism 
and  theological  determinism,  it  is  important  to  consider 
whether  there  is  any  vital  relation  between  thought  and  prac- 
tice ;  whether  there  is  warrant  for  the  above  assertion  regarding 
the  relation  between  a  deterministic  world-view  and  the  pro- 
gramme of  active  life. 

Consideration  must  be  given  to  Martineau's  statement :  "The 
real  life  of  men,  even  upon  its  inner  side,  is  not  shaped  by  philo- 
sophical systems  or  moved  forward  on  lines  of  consecutive 
logic."^  To  the  same  purport  is  Sidgwick's  well  known  opinion 
that  practical  ethical  interests  are  not  vitally  influenced  by  our 
theory  of  the  will.  Such  statements  are  very  often  distorted 
and  interpreted  as  if  the  author  intimated  that  correct  thought 
is  not  a  prerequisite  of  consistent  and  correct  action.  These 
thinkers  never  deny  that  all  concrete  application  of  thought  to 
life  consciously  or  unconsciously  implies  an  abstract  but 
rational  element.  It  only  means  that  men  often  find  their 
system  of  thought  in  the  application  of  thought  and  not  vice 
versa. 

A  distinction  between  two  kinds  of  consciousness  may  clarify 
our  meaning.  Intuitional  consciousness  is  that  activity  of  the 
mind  which  is  spontaneously  generated  when  reality  comes  in 
contact  with  the  apprehending  mind.  Its  content  is  exceeding- 
ly complex,  containing  both  feeling  and  reason.  Reflective 
consciousness,  on  the  other  hand,  is  that  activity  of  the  mind 
which  is  discursively  generated  when  the  content  of  intuitional 
consciousness  is  disintegrated  into  its  constituent  elements,  and 
their  mutual  relations  resolved  into  grounds  and  consequences. 
The  one  is  concrete  thinking,  the  other  abstract ;  the  one  is  the 
''real  life  of  men,"  the  other  ''philosophical  system"  and 
"consecutive  logic";  the  one  is  Bismarck  and  Gladstone,  the 
other  Holland  and  Austin ;  the  one  is  the  poet  and  the  painter, 
the  other  the  critic  and  the  grammarian.  It  is  the  concrete 
thinker  that  creates  in  the  arts  and  makes  progress  in  practical 
life,  but  he  owes  an  incalculable  debt  to  the  abstract  thinker, 

^A  Study  of  Religion,  Vol.  II,  p.  196. 

14 


THEORY  AND  PRACTICE 


15 


who  systematizes  and  preserves  the  true  and  the  good.  In  a 
very  real  sense,  therefore,  abstract  and  theoretical  thought 
becomes  the  content  and  guiding  principle  for  the  men  who 
frame  laws,  control  industry,  and  conduct  schools  and  churches. 

If  it  is  agreed,  then,  that  the  dominant  thought  of  a  people 
is  uniquely  formative  in  practical  affairs,  we  are  prepared  to 
discuss  the  more  specific  problem,  namely,  the  relation  of 
deterministic  thought  to  life. 

The  most  fundamental  thing  in  a  man's  religious  life  is  his 
conception  of  God ;  the  most  fundamental  thing  in  his  social 
life  is  his  conception  of  man.  There  can  be  no  consistent 
theory  of  government,  no  philosophy  of  education,  no  science 
of  philanthropy  without  a  clear  conception  of  the  nature  of  the 
individual  self.  And  as  the  estimate  of  the  Ego  changes, 
slowly  but  surely  there  is  a  readjustment  in  every  sociaP  insti- 
tution. Broadly  speaking  there  are  only  two  conceptions  of  the 
self.  The  first  is  that  the  Ego  is  a  product,  the  second  that  the 
Ego  is  partly  product  but  essentially  producer.  The  one  makes 
the  self  a  creature,  the  other  creature  and  creator.  Of  course  in 
no  age  and  in  no  country  is  there  unanimity  as  to  the  nature  of 
the  individual.  If  there  were  unanimity,  all  social  problems 
would  be  much  simplified.  If  man  is  a  product,  and  if  the 
factors  of  the  product  are  discernible  and  subject  to  manipula- 
tion, then  the  modus  operandi  is  a  comparatively  easy  task. 
Just  as  the  course  of  a  river  can  be  guided  by  digging  and 
damming  so  the  course  of  human  life,  in  the  individual  or  in 
group,  is  manageable  by  external  means.  If  man  is  a  resultant 
of  moments  under  the  control  of  human  authorities,  then  gov- 
ernment, education  and  morality  reduce  themselves  to  physics, 
biology  and  eugenics.  This  is  the  logical  outcome  of  a  natural- 
istic conception  of  the  nature  of  man. 

The  most  potent  influence  among  any  people  is  religion. 
Ultimately  the  kind  of  Deity  a  people  worships  determines 
the  kind  of  selfhood  it  attributes  to  the  individual.  And  the 
conception  of  the  self  becomes  structural  in  the  organization 
of  social  institutions.  In  this  respect  the  present  age  affords  no 
exception.  But  the  influence  to-day  that  is  second  only  to 
religion  is  science.     And  this  science  is  Darwinian  in  thought 

*  'Social'  here  as  elsewhere  is  used  in  the  comprehensive  sense  to 
include  politics,  economics,  education,  etc. 


l6  CRITICISM   OF   DETERMINISM 

and  method  and  naturalistic  in  its  interpretation  of  reality. 
Since  the  publication  of  the  Origin  of  Species  every  scientific 
textbook  has  been  rewritten;  the  principles  of  ethics  have 
been  reformulated;  sacred  and  secular  history  have  been  re- 
vised. In  a  very  singular  way  this  modern  scientific  thought 
has  also  accented  the  notion  that  the  self  is  merely  a  product 
of  nature.  Heredity  and  environment  completely  account  for 
the  conduct  of  the  individual.  It  is  not  strange,  therefore,  that 
marked  paternalistic  tendencies  have  been  displayed  in  the 
wake  of  modern  science. 

In  making  the  claim  that  evolutionary  naturalism  tends  to 
mechanize  society,  I  am  not  unmindful  of  Spencer's  Social 
Organism.  Spencer  undoubtedly  attempted  the  most  compre- 
hensive and  thorough  application  of  evolutionary  thought  and 
method.  He  is  the  unqualified  champion  of  the  ladssez  faire 
theory  of  government.  The  state  in  its  various  forms  is  as 
much  a  natural  organism  as  any  living  being.  Parliament  is 
the  brain;  arteries  and  veins  find  their  counterparts  in  public 
highways  and  railroads.  Just  as  an  animal  or  a  tree  matures 
naturally,  so  the  individuals  composing  the  state,  if  only  they 
are  left  alone,  will  eliminate  the  evil  and  enhance  the  good. 

Space  does  not  permit  an  extensive  criticism  of  Spencer's 
theory  of  government.  In  passing,  however,  it  may  be  observed 
that  the  tendency  of  politics  in  the  countries  where  evolution- 
ary thought  has  been  most  exploited  has  been  just  the  opposite 
of  Spencer's  theoretical  claims.  Huxley,  who  practically 
started  with  the  same  premises,  came  to  collectivistic  conclu- 
sions in  the  realm  of  practical  politics.  I  think  that  in  Admin- 
istrative Nihilism  his  argument  against  Spencer  is  cogent, 
when  he  insists  that  the  logical  outcome  of  a  naturalistic  con- 
ception of  man  is  the  assumption  by  the  state  of  more  and  more 
personal  functions.^ 

'"But  if  the  resemblances  between  the  body  physiological  and  the 
body  politic  are  any  indication,  not  only  of  what  the  latter  is,  and  how 
it  has  become  what  it  is,  but  of  what  it  ought  to  be,  and  what  it  is 
tending  to  become,  I  cannot  but  think  that  the  real  force  of  the  analogy 
is  totally  opposed  to  the  negative  view  of  State  function. 

"Suppose  that,  in  accordance  with  this  view,  each  muscle  were  to 
maintain  that  the  nervous  system  had  no  right  to  interfere  with  its 
contraction,  except  to  prevent  it  from  hindering  the  contraction  of 
another  muscle;  or  each  gland,  that  it  had  a  right  to  secrete,  so  long 
as  its  secretion  interfered  with  no  other ;  suppose  every  separate  cell 


THEORY  AND  PRACTICE  17 

If  it  is  conceded  that  a  naturalistic  determinism,  by  deposing 
the  self  from  its  high  office,  tends  to  produce  a  mechanistic 
society,  the  question  still  remains  whether  a  deterministic  con- 
ception in  religion  produces  the  same  result.  The  term  theo- 
logical determinism  may  be  used  in  two  senses. 

In  the  strict  sense  it  implies  that  th^oDeity  predestined  from 
the  beginning  all  things  that  come  to  pass,  both  good  and  evil. 
Mohammedanism  and  Augustinianism  are  very  specific  in  this 
respect.  Say  the  Koran  and  the  Traditions,  "The  Prophet 
said,  verily,  the  first  thing  which  God  created  was  the  pen,  and 
He  said  to  it  write.  It  said,  what  shall  I  write  ?  He  said,  write 
down  the  divine  decrees  (quadar)  ;  and  it  wrote  down  all  that 
was  and  all  that  will  be  to  eternity.  .  .  .  He  leads  astray 
whom  He  will  and  guides  whom  He  will.  .  .  .  Verily  God 
most  high  has  ordained  five  things  on  each  of  His  servants  from 
His  creation :  his  appointed  time,  his  actions,  his  dwelling  place, 
his  travels  and  his  subsistence.  .  .  .  When  God  creates  any 
servant  for  heaven.  He  causes  him  to  go  in  the  way  of  those 
destined  for  heaven,  until  he  dies,  after  which  He  takes  him  to 
heaven.  And  when  He  creates  any  servant  for  the  fire  of  hell, 
then  He  causes  him  to  go  in  the  way  of  those  destined  for 
hell  until  his  death,  after  which  He  takes  him  to  hell."  So 
Omar  Khayyam  sums  up  the  prose  into  poetry : 

"The  moving  finger  writes ;  and,  having  writ, 
Moves  on ;  nor  all  your  piety  or  wit 
Shall  lure  it  back  to  cancel  half  a  line, 
Nor  all  your  tears  wash  out  a  word  of  it." 

In  this  particular  doctrine  the  Westminster  Confession  of 
Faith  uses  very  similar  terminology.  In  speaking  of  "God's 
eternal  decrees"  it  states :  "God  from  all  eternity  did  by  the 
most  wise  and  holy  counsel  of  His  own  will  freely  and  un- 

left  free  to  follow  its  own  "interest"  and  laissez  faire  lord  of  all, 
what  would  become  of  the  body  physiological? 

"The  fact  is  that  the  sovereign  power  of  the  body  thinks  for  the 
physiological  organism,  acts  for  it,  and  rules  the  individual  compon- 
ents with  a  rod  of  iron.  Even  the  blood-corpuscles  can't  hold  a 
public  meeting  without  being  accused  of  'Congestion' — and  the  brain, 
like  other  despots  whom  we  have  known,  calls  out  at  once  for  the  use 
of  sharp  steel  against  them."  Methods  and  Results,  Essays,  "Adminis- 
trative Nihilism."  p.  271. 


l8  CRITICISM  OF  DETERMINISM 

changeably   ordain   whatsoever   comes   to   pass ;  ...  By   the 
decree  of  God,  for  the  manifestation  of  His  glory,  some  men 
and  angels  are  predestined  unto  everlasting  life,  and  others 
fore-ordained  to  everlasting  death.    These  angels  and  men,  thus 
predestined  and  fore-ordained,  are  particularly  and  unchange- 
ably designed ;  and  their  number  is  so  certain  and  definite  that 
it  cannot  be  either  increased  or  diminished." 
'    In  the  broader  sense  theological  determinism  includes  the 
•conception  of  God  in  which  it  is  held  that  He  rules  with  an  iron 
*hand,  directly  or  indirectly  through  appointed  agents,  all  His 
^subjects.      The    future   programme   seems   less    rigidly    fixed 
•than  in  the  more  logical  determinism.     The  ideal  of  the  Old 
Testament  theocracy  was  such  a  conception.     The  pattern  of 
•the  tabernacle  as  well  as  the  law  and  the  plans  of  battle  came 

*  directly  from  God.     The  Roman  Church  ultimately  is  based 

*  on  the  same  conception.    God,  the  pope,  and  the  priests  control 
-the  destiny  of  each  individual. 

But  in  both  the  broad  and  narrow  sense  there  is  a  common 
element.  The  self  is  not  merged  into  the  Infinite,  as  is  the 
case  in  pantheism,  but  the  standing  or  the  destiny  of  the  self 
at  any  moment  is  determined  and  is  the  product  of  agencies 
outside  the  self.  In  naturahsm  the  agents  are  heredity  and 
environment.  In  theological  determinism  there  is  added  a  third 
factor,  namely,  the  personal  agency  of  the  Deity  or  his  repre- 
sentative on  earth.  The  more  deterministic  the  religious  con- 
ception is,  the  less  significant  becomes  the  self.  The  individual, 
like  a  small  stone  in  a  mosaic  picture,  is  fitted  into  his  destined 
place  by  the  master  artist  and  his  contribution  to  the  artistic 
effect  of  the  whole  comes  from  his  passivity  and  not  from  his 
activity. 

The  most  telling  example  of  the  relation  between  a  determin- 
istic theology  and  social  institutions  is  furnished  by  the  history 
of  Mohammedanism.  The  study  is  exceptionally  fruitful  be- 
cause the  complex  influences,  which  are  so  numerous  in  other 
similar  theological  views,  are  conspicuously  absent.  In  the 
thirteen  centuries  of  Moslem  history  its  religious  tenets  have 
remained  singularly  intact.  In  predestinarianism  is  to  be  found 
both  the  strength  and  the  weakness  of  the  Moslem  faith.  No 
more  indomitable  soldiers  ever  took  the  field  than  the  early 
followers  of  Mohammed.  Their  onward  march  seemed  irre- 
sistible.   The  man  at  the  battle  front  is  as  immune  to  death  as 


THEORY  AND  PRACTICE 


19 


the  non-combatant  until  the  ''appointed  time."  In  the  time  of 
peace,  however,  this  same  assurance  produces  a  different  result. 
Inclination  becomes  the  guide  of  life.  Self-exertion  is  mini- 
mized because  it  avails  nothing.  Society  becomes  sterile  and 
stagnant.  Mohammedan  civilization  is  strong  evidence  of  the 
decadent  influence  of  spiritual  determinism.  Its  institutions 
and  its  individuals  are  hampered  and  mechanized  by  law,  rule, 
and  tradition. 

The  history  of  the  Jewish  nation  and  of  Catholicism  bear  out 
the  same  truth  that  the  more  the  individual  is  conceived  as  a 
necessary  fixture  in  the  economy  of  God  and  the  church,  the 
more  legalistic,  ritualistic,  and  paternalistic  become  the  social 
institutions  in  the  respective  civilizations. 

It  is  true  that  deterministic  theology  in  protestant  countries 
has  often  developed  marked  individualistic  tendencies.  Kuyper 
in  his  lectures  on  Calvinism  points  out  very  eloquently  how  the 
Calvinistic  faith  has  been  the  champion  of  liberty  and  democ- 
racy in  Holland,  England  and  America.  But  no  one  seriously 
claims  that  such  results  are  traceable  to  the  teaching  of  pre- 
destination. The  right  of  private  judgment  and  the  teaching 
that  man  is  ultimately  subject  to  no  human  authority  have  had 
the  most  pronounced  political  consequences.  The  keynote  of 
the  Reformation  was  not  determinism  but  rather  this:  ''God 
alone  is  Lord  of  the  conscience;  and  hath  left  it  free  from  the 
doctrine  and  commandments  of  men,  which  are  in  anything 
contrary  to  his  word,  or  besides  it  in  matters  of  faith  or 
worship." 

The  spirit  of  the  Renaissance  quite  apart  from  religion,  as 
embodied  in  such  men  as  Erasmus  and  Reuchlin,  was  also  a 
great  liberalizing  agency.  When  it  is,  therefore,  said  that  Cal- 
vinism produced  certain  results,  it  must  be  remembered  that 
Calvinism  is  a  comprehensive  term.  It  developed  in  a  complex 
age,  which  was  characterized  by  many  independent  movements. 
The  beneficent  influence  of  Galvanism  was  produced  not  be- 
cause of,  but  in  spite  of,  its  predestinarian  doctrine.  In  due 
time  it  will  be  considered  whether  Calvinism  leaves  any  room 
for  self-initiation.  In  so  far  as  it  does  minimize  the  efficiency 
of  the  self,  it  tends  to  treat  the  individual  in  the  same  manner 
as  other  deterministic  systems.  It  is  highly  significent  that 
Calvin's  rule  in  Geneva  developed  a  most  rigorous  paternalistic 
government. 


20  CRITICISM  OF  DETERMINISM 

It  is  perhaps  anticipating  to  say  that  the  writer  conceives 
the  self  both  as  creature  and  creator.  This  means  that  there 
will  always  be  need  of  law,  form  and  ritual  in  our  institutions. 
The  keen  insight  of  the  statesman  will  be  required  to  determine 
when  the  restrictions  on  the  creature  become  a  detriment  to  the 
creator.  But  no  one  can  become  a  true  guide  in  practical 
afifairs  who  has  not  first  settled  the  problem  of  the  nature  of 
the  self.  The  fact  that  evolutionary  naturalism  and  theological 
determinism,  with  its  accent  on  total  depravity  and  predestina- 
tion, have  deprived  the  self  of  significant  independence,  makes 
it  of  vital  importance  to  examine  the  foundations  on  which 
these  two  systems  rest. 


Ill     NATURALISM 
What  is  Naturalism? 

Philosophy  is  engaged  in  a  very  ambitious  undertaking,  for 
it  attempts  to  capture  and  exhibit  things  that  evade  the  ordi- 
nary observer.  The  difficuhy  that  confronts  a  missionary,  who 
tries  to  disseminate  a  monotheistic  conception  of  God  among 
illiterate  tribes,  is  not  unlike  the  task  of  the  philosopher  who 
essays  to  give  a  clear  exposition  of  his  own  convictions. 
Thought  is  always  elusive  and  language  a  poor  vehicle.  In 
this  respect  the  metaphysician  makes  confession  with  the  poet 
of  "Fancies  that  broke  through  language  and  escaped."  The 
fact  that  words  are  an  inadequate  expression  of  the  real  spirit 
of  any  philosophic  persuasion,  makes  it  almost  presumptuous 
for  any  one  to  attempt  a  valuation  or  summary  of  a  system  of 
thought  to  which  he  himself  can  not  subscribe.  It  is  ludicrous, 
not  to  say  pathetic,  for  a  speaker  to  boast  that  he  will  present 
both  sides  of  a  question  impartially.  No  one  can  become  thor- 
oughly familiar  with  any  vital  question  without  coming  to 
some  personal  conclusion.  And  when  the  conclusion  is  made, 
tacitly  or  avowedly,  the  multifarious  data,  which  once  seemed 
so  flexible,  become  fixed ;  they  receive  a  new  color  and  meaning, 
now  that  they  are  definitely  related  to  an  espoused  end.  With 
these  limitations  clearly  in  mind  we  continue  our  study. 

The  child,  perhaps,  is  the  best  exponent  of  naturalism.  It 
finds  itself  in  a  world  of  time,  space  and  objects,  which  im- 
pinge upon  its  sense  organs  and  act  and  react  upon  each  other. 
The  vital  problem  of  its  existence  is  to  learn  the  language, 
meaning  and  content  of  things  in  order  to  relate^  itself  to  them 
in  the  most  economic  way.  It  takes  things  at  their  par  value. 
From  the  geography  of  its  body  it  passes  to  that  of  the  home, 
the  immediate  vicinity,  and  finally  to  the  larger  and  fuller 
world  of  nature.    It  makes  a  cosmos  out  of  chaos,  not  by  the 

^  The  question  of  self  and  not-self,  implied  by  the  word  'relate/  does 
not  enter  the  child  consciousness.  In  this  unreflective  stage  the 
cognitive  function  is  not  unlike  that  of  the  animal,  i.  o.  accommodation. 


22  CRITICISM  OF  DETERMINISM 

introduction  of  a  new  principle  of  interpretation,  but  by  passive 
obedience  and  by  observation  of  things  just  as  they  exist.  The 
knowledge  of  reality  comes  like  the  knowledge  of  a  foreign 
tongue.  The  word,  the  sentence  and  the  meaning  are  not 
changed  because  a  new  individual  masters  them.  The  attitude 
of  the  naturalistic  thinker  is  not  unlike  that  of  the  child.  He 
finds  himself  in  mediis  rebus;  multiplicity  and  heterogeneity 
prevail.  Things  must  be  related,  unified  and  explained  in 
order  that  life  may  be  fruitful.  He  sets  about  his  task  in  the 
most  natural  way.^  From  his  childhood  experience  he  has 
learned  how  to  reduce  the  complex  to  the  simple;  how  to 
explain  phenomena  that  were  once  inexplicable;  how  to  find 
significance  in  the  insignificant.  The  results  thus  far  have  only 
been  an  earnest  of  the  things  to  come.  With  logic  and  science 
as  his  trusted  field-marshals  the  naturalistic  warrior  goes  forth 
boldly  seeking  new  conquests. 

What  are  the  conquests  of  naturalism?  What  are  its  con- 
clusions? Most  important  is  the  claimed  reduction  of  the 
qualitative  to  the  quantitative,  the  world  of  appreciation  to  the 
world  of  description,  the  spiritual  to  the  material.  Science 
comes  in  the  role  of  a  great  emancipator.  The  scalpel  and  the 
laboratory  have  freed  us  from  the  myth  of  freedom,  religion 
and  personality.  "Belief  in  the  so-called  freedom  of  the  will," 
says  Dr.  P.  W.  Van  Peyma,  "is  a  relic  and  an  inheritance  of  an 
unscientific  past;  an  age  of  belief  in  devils  and  witches,  in 
magic  and  miracles;  in  divine  interposition  and  special  provi- 
dence. But  as  knowledge  widens  we  find  that  the  range  of 
possibilities  is  lost  in  necessity."*  Huxley  is  well  qualified  to 
speak  for  his  school  and  therefore  the  following  citation  is 
significant : 

"Any  one  who  is  acquainted  with  the  history  of  science  will 
admit,  that  its  progress  has  in  all  ages  meant,  and  now  more 
than  ever  means  that  extension  of  what  we  call  matter  and 
causation,  and  the  concomitant  gradual  banishment  from  all 
regions  of  human  thought  of  what  we  call  spirit  and  spon- 
taneity.   .  .  .  And  as  surely  as  every  future  grows  out  of  the 

'  Whether  the  thinker  begins  as  Pearson  does  in  Grammar  of  Science 
with  sensation,  or  with  bodies  as  is  the  case  with  Ostwald  in  Primer 
of  Naturalism  the  method  is  the  same,  namely,  to  start  with  that  which 
is  immediately  given. 

'  The  Why  of  the  Will,  p.  41. 


NATURALISM 


23 


past  and  present  so  will  the  physiology  of  the  future  gradually 
extend  the  realm  of  matter  and  law  until  it  is  coextensive  with 
knowledge,  with  feeling,  and  with  action.  The  consciousness 
of  this  great  truth  weighs  like  a  nightmare  upon  many  of  the 
best  minds  of  these  days.  The  advancing  tide  of  matter  threat- 
ens to  drown  their  souls ;  the  tightening  grasp  of  law  impedes 
their  freedom."* 

Hume  in  a  less  serious  vein  graphically  expresses  the  same 
convictions.  *'If  we  take  in  hand  any  volume  of  divinity  or 
school  metaphysics,  for  instance,  let  us  ask.  Does  it  contain  any 
abstract  reasoning  concerning  quantity  or  number  ?  No.  Does 
it  contain  any  experimental  reasoning  concerning  matter  of 
fact  and  existence?  No.  Commit  it  then  to  the  flames,  for  it 
can  contain  nothing  but  sophistry  and  illusion."^ 

The  above  quotations  hardly  represent  the  real  temper  and 
attitude  of  the  naturalistic  thinker  of  to-day.  In  most  writers 
one  finds  a  pathetic  sense  of  loss  and  regret.^  They  are  aware 
that  something  valuable  has  vanished  from  their  lives.  It  is 
not  that  they  are  enemies  of  religion,  God,  and  spiritual  values ; 
but  all  these  are  found  to  be  supernumeraries,  and  thus  are 
naturally  eliminated  from  the  construction  of  reality.  Laplace's 
reply  to  Napoleon's  query  when  he  presented  his  Mecanique 

*  Collected  Essays,  Eversley  Edition,  Vol.  I,  p.  159. 
^  Inquiry  Concerning  the  Human  Understanding. 

•  "It  is  therefore  with  the  utmost  sorrow  that  I  find  myself  compelled 
to  accept  the  conclusions  here  worked  out;  and  nothing  would  have 
induced  me  to  publish  them,  save  the  strength  of  my  conviction  that  it 
is  the  duty  of  every  member  of  society  to  give  his  fellows  the  benefit 
of  his  labours  for  whatever  they  may  be  worth.  ...  I  am  not 
ashamed  to  confess  that  with  this  virtual  negation  of  God  the  universe 
to  me  has  lost  its  soul  of  loveliness;  ...  I  think,  as  think  at  times  I 
must,  of  the  appalling  contrast  between  the  hallowed  glory  of  that 
creed  which  once  was  mine,  and  the  lonely  mystery  of  existence  as  now 
I  find  it, — at  such  times  I  shall  ever  feel  it  impossible  to  avoid  the 
sharpest  pang  of  which  my  nature  is  susceptible.  For  whether  it  be 
due  to  my  intelligence  not  being  sufficiently  advanced  to  meet  the 
requirements  of  the  age,  or  whether  it  be  due  to  the  memory  of  those 
sacred  associations  which  to  me  at  least  were  the  sweetest  that  life  has 
given,  I  cannot  but  feel  that  for  me,  and  for  others  who  think  as  I  do, 
there  is  a  dreadful  truth  in  those  words  of  Hamilton, — Philosophy 
having  become  a  meditation,  not  merely  of  death,  but  of  annihilation, 
the  precept  know  thyself  has  become  transformed  into  the  terrific 
oracle  of  Oedipus — 'Mayest  thou  ne'er  know  the  truth  of  what  thou 
art:'"     Romanes,  A  Candid  Examination  of  Theism,  pp.  113,  114. 


24  CRITICISM  OF  DETERMINISM 

Celeste  fairly  represents  the  position  of  the  scientist.  "M. 
Laplace,"  said  Napoleon,  ''they  tell  me  you  have  written  this 
large  book  on  the  system  of  the  universe  and  have  never 
mentioned  its  Creator."  Laplace's  answer  was  brief  but  to  the 
point:  *'Sir  I  have  no  need  of  any  such  hypothesis."^  And 
the  scientist  is  not  without  an  answer  if  it  is  asked  why  he  has 
no  need  of  such  an  hypothesis ;  why  spirit  and  consciousness 
are  not  permitted  to  remain  as  independent  entities. 

It  is  a  safe  principle  in  any  investigation  to  begin  with  the 
known  and  the  definite.  At  least  provisionally,  reality  must  be 
defined  as  the  heaviest  things  in  life;  the  things  that  can  be 
grasped  by  the  senses  and  can  be  manipulated  by  experimenta- 
tion. But  the  observer  soon  finds  that  many  "weighty" 
matters  have  no  tangible  form.  They  can  not  be  subsumed 
under  physical  categories.  Introspection  intrudes  into  the 
scientist's  sanctuary.  Consciousness  becomes  a  very  tantalizing 
companion.  The  naturalist,  however,  has  a  very  plausible 
explanation  for  all  spiritual  conceptions.  Religion  and  morality 
serve  a  useful  purpose,  but  they  are  prone  to  forget  their 
humble  origin.  The  bright  tungsten  light  is  many  steps  re- 
moved from,  but  it  is  nevertheless  directly  and  quantitatively 
related  to,  the  black  and  inert  piece  of  coal. 

The  classification  of  material  things  is  made  possible  because 
nature  has  a  rationalistic  structure.  Everywhere  there  is 
Einheit  in  Verschiedenheit.  If  unity  and  uniformity  did  not 
exist  logic  would  be  but  a  name ;  nature  could  have  no  spokes- 
man ;  language  and  mutual  intercourse  would  be  impossible.  A 
world  without  uniformity  would  be  like  a  body  without  a 
skeleton :  there  would  be  no  coherence,  no  permanency  and  no 
articulate  expression.  The  same  uniformity  that  prevails  in 
the  construction  of  bodies  also  obtains  in  the  action  and  reaction 
among  them.  A  formulation  of  the  way  bodies  behave  is 
called  a  law  of  nature.  Its  validity  depends  on  the  insoluble 
nexus  between  cause  and  efifect,  between  antecedent  and  conse- 
quent. All  action  or  efficiency  is  quantitatively  measurable. 
Reality  must  and  can  be  explained  in  this  descriptive  termi- 
nology of  science.  If  anything  is  not  thus  explicable  it  is 
designated,  by  virtue  of  that  fact,  as  a  pseudo-phenomenon. 
This  principle  of  uniformity,  which  is  so  easily  detected  in  the 
inorganic  world,  is  then  rigorously  applied  to  the  organic 
'W.  W.  Rouse  Ball,  Short  History  of  Mathematics,  p.  388. 


NATURALISM  25 

world,  the  animal  kingdom,  and  the  conscious  life  of  man.  It 
is  in  this  connection  that  the  naturalist  makes  use  of  the  facts 
furnished  by  evolution.  With  the  aid  of  this  information  he 
claims  to  be  able  satisfactorily  to  explain  the  mental  in  terms 
of  the  physical  and  to  reduce  self-consciousness  to  terms  which 
are  amenable  to  scientific  formulae. 

The  amoeba  is  a  unicellular  protoplasmic  animal.  In  the 
ordinary  sense  this  organism  has  no  digestive  organs,  no 
muscles,  and  no  nervous  system.  However,  the  whole  animal 
has  the  contractility  of  muscle  and  the  irritability  of  nerve. 
The  assimilation  of  food,  the  excretion  of  waste  matter,  and 
the  reproductive  process  are  carried  on  by  no  special  organs  but 
are  performed  by  the  organism  as  a  whole.  If  any  external 
stimulus,  mechanical  or  chemical,  impinges  on  the  periphery,  a 
specific  amount  of  latent  energy  is  set  free  and  manifests  itself 
in  a  definite  reaction.  This  response  is  determined  entirely  by 
the  strength  and  kind  of  irritant  and  the  nature  and  state  of  the 
particular  amoeba  affected.  The  higher  forms  of  animal,  and 
man  in  particular,  are  only  a  more  complete  organization  of  a 
large  number  of  protoplasmic  cells.  The  ova-sperm,  which  is 
a  fusion  of  the  ovum  and  spermatozoon,  contains  all  the  latent 
possibilities  of  the  mature  man.  By  a  process  of  cleavage  or 
segmentation  the  cells  multiply  very  rapidly.  As  the  division 
continues  the  structure  and  the  function  of  the  various  parts 
become  specialized.  In  due  time  the  ova-sperm  has  differenti- 
ated itself  into  muscles,  bones,  nerves,  and  special  senses. 

Man's  reaction  to  external  stimulation  is  not  unlike  that 
of  the  amoeba.  In  a  pure  reflex  action  there  is  no  con- 
sciousness concomitant  with  the  response.  In  the  higher 
forms  of  response  there  is  an  invariable  concomitant  phe- 
nomenon (better  designated  epiphenomenon)  called  con- 
sciousness. But  here  also,  as  was  the  case  with  the  less 
developed  organism,  the  afferent  impulse  plus  the  nature  of  the 
nerve  center,  which  releases  the  stored-up  energy,  account 
quantitatively  for  the  strength  of  the  efferent  reaction.  The 
most  unique  manifestation  of  consciousness  in  higher  animals 
is  volition.  When  conflicting  impulses  come  to  consciousness 
it  is,  of  course,  impossible  to  respond  to  both.  In  all  such 
appeals  there  is  consciously  or  unconsciously  a  preponderance 
of  inclination  in  favor  of  one  of  the  alternatives.  A  so-called 
decision  of  the  will  is  merely  the  turning  of  the  scales  in  the 


26  CRITICISM  OF  DETERMINISM 

direction  of  the  greater  weight.  Consciousness  may  thus  be 
considered  either  as  nature's  extreme  example  of  the  versa- 
tiHty  of  transformed  energy,  or  the  necessary  concomitant  of  a 
certain  pecuHar  configuration  of  living  cells.  As  convexity 
implies  concavity,  so  certain  cell  arrangements  may  imply  con- 
scious life.^ 

The  application  of  biometric  methods  to  biology  and  psy- 
chology have  furnished  support  to  the  above  contention.  There 
is  at  least  a  vital  conditioning  if  not  a  causal  relation  betvv^een 
the  shape,  structure  and  quality  of  the  brain  and  nervous 
system  and  the  moral,  mental  and  spiritual  condition  of  races 
and  individuals.  The  different  nervous  constitution,  and  not 
any  spiritual  condition,  distinguishes  the  phlegmatic  German 
from  the  emotional  Frenchman.  Lombroso®  and  his  school 
undoubtedly  made  exaggerated  claims  in  regard  to  the  ''crim- 
inal type,"  still  a  careful  tabulation  of  the  physiological 
features  of  men  and  v^omen  who  find  their  way;  into  penal 
institutions  substantiates  the  claim  that  certain  congenital 
physical  characteristics  convey  moral  and  mental  deficiencies. 
The  determinacy  of  human  action  is  also  argued  from  the  fact 
that  the  future  acts  of  a  group  of  individuals  can  be  foretold 
with  greater  certainty,  for  example,  than  the  meteorologist 
can  forecast  the  weather.  And  whenever  any  sudden  change 
occurs  in  the  predicted  results  it  is  generally  admitted  that 
some  external  condition  has  changed,  and  the  disturbance  in 
turn  has  influenced  the  individuals.^^  The  strict  dependence  of 
the  mental  on  the  physical ;  the  reduction  of  the  immaterial  and 
qualitative  to  the  material  and  quantitative ;  the  leveling  of  all 
phenomena  to  a  common  denominator  of  energy  or  matter  in 
motion,  are  but  the  heralds  of  "the  advancing  tide  of  matter" 
whose  onward  progress  strengthens  "the  tightening  grasp  of 
law."  Nothing  but  a  thoroughgoing  determinism  can  result 
from    the   naturalistic    interpretation    of    the   world.      Every 

*C/.  Prof.  H.  C.  Warren's  address,  The  Mental  and  the  Physical, 
Psychological    Review,    March,    1914. 

•  Lombroso  in  his  "L'homo  Delinquent"  distinguishes  the  born 
criminal  type  from  other  men  by  the  following  stigmata: 

1.  Excessive  asymmetry  of  the  skull. 

2.  Small  cranial  capacity. 

3.  Abnormal  features. 

4.  Slight  growth  of  beard  relative  to  hair  on  head. 

"C/.  Rashdall,  The  Theory  of  Good  and  Evil,  Vol.  II,  p.  310. 


PRINCIPLE  OF  EXTENSION  2/ 

thought  and  act  at  any  moment  is  determined  by  the  state  of 
the  individual  and  his  environmental  conditions.  But  his  state 
and  environment  at  any  time  are  the  necessary  products  of  the 
natural  course  of  events.  Just  as  the  position  of  a  grain  of 
sand  on  the  beach  is  the  resultant  of  untold  but  definite  physical 
antecedents,  so  each  emotion,  each  thought,  each  page  of 
history  has  had  an  equally  fixed  chain  of  quantitatively  measur- 
able antecedents.  If  naturalism  is  true  then  a  free  self- 
determining  agent  is  a  myth  and  a  delusion. 

CRITICISM 

If  the  foregoing  exposition  is  a  fair  presentation  of  the 
nature,  method  and  purpose  of  naturalism,  the  way  is  opened 
for  a  critical  examination.  Does  the  scientific  method  alone, 
if  at  all,  lead  to  reality?  Is  science  justified  in  making  state- 
ments concerning  the  'Vhat"  as  contrasted  with  the  "how"? 
Does  not  the  naturalistic  position  ultimately  rest  on  speculative 
thought  and  presuppositions  which  can  never  become  elements 
of  experience  nor  objects  of  experimentation,  and  thus  depend 
for  their  substantiation  on  proof  other  than  scientific?  The 
following  lines  of  thought,  it  seems  to  me,  reveal  the  most 
vulnerable  parts  of  the  naturalistic  armor.  To  say  that  these 
arguments  per  se  are  conclusive  would  be  philosophic  arro- 
gance; but  the  claim  that  these  observations,  regarding  the 
naturalistic  position,  militate  against  a  coherent  and  consistent 
construction  of  the  data  furnished  by  the  world  as  a  whole,  is 
but  the  outcome  of  an  attempt  genuinely  to  comprehend  things 
in  their  totality.  Apart  from  the  domain  where  demonstrative 
evidence  is  procurable,  no  single  argument  or  cluster  of  argu- 
ments is  sufficient  to  disprove  a  system  of  thought.  It  is 
rather  the  cumulative  effect  of  the  main  arguments,  coupled 
with  innumerable  necessary  implications,  that  is  most  potent  in 
producing  conviction. 

A.       SCIENTIFIC    PRINCIPLE    OF    EXTENSION 

My  first  contention  is  that  the  so-called  "scientific  principle  • 
of  extension"  may  lead  to  error  whenever  the  conclusion  does  * 
not  permit  of  concrete  verification. 

Scientific  reasoning  proceeds  in  a  straight  line.  The  scientist 
reasons  forward  and  backward  on  this  line,  always,  however. 


28  CRITICISM  OF  DETERMINISM 

assuming  the  uniformity  and  continuity  of  nature.  When 
he  comes  to  the  linear  limits  of  observable  data,  he  projects 
over  the  limit  and  assumes  that  the  same  processes  which  took 
place  within  the  limits,  where  scientific  data  were  observable, 
will  take  place,  or  have  taken  place,  in  the  same  manner  outside 
those  limits.  For  example  the  scientist  measures  temperature 
by  the  expansion  or  contraction  of  some  substance.  This 
process  is  observable  within  narrow  limits,  but  the  assumption 
is  made  that  the  same  quantitative  change  takes  place  after 
verification  is  no  longer  possible.  But  it  is  quite  conceivable 
and  even  probable  that  there  may  ensue  a  qualitative  change 
in  the  process,  or  that  the  same  numerical  relation  between 
temperature  and  volume  no  longer  obtains.  This  actually 
happens  in  the  case  of  water.  Down  to  a  certain  degree  water 
contracts  as  the  temperature  is  lowered,  but  at  a  critical  point 
the  process  is  completely  reversed  and  the  water  begins  to 
expand. 

9     This  possibility  of  error  is  much  enhanced  when  the  principle 
•of  extension  is  applied  to  social,  economic,  historical,  moral 
•and  religious  phenomena,  i.  e.  in  the  realm  where  self-con- 
*sciousness  becomes  a  potent  factor.    The  "law  of  diminishing 
utility"  is  an  illuminating  example.     "As  the  amount  of  any 
good  increases,  after  a  certain  point  the  gratification  that  the 
added  portions  afford  decreases. "^^    The  diminution  of  gratifi- 
cation continues  until  ultimately  pleasure  is  changed  to  pain. 
In  the  study  of  social  conditions  it  is  found  that  as  people 
collect  in  a  locality,  thus  making  cooperation  possible,  better 
sanitation,  education  and  general  welfare  ensue.     But  when 
the  size  of  the  city  passes  a  certain  point,  not  only  do  increased 
advantages  cease,  but  many  additional  evils  become  manifest. 

In  most  of  the  cases  cited  above  verification  is  possible,  and 
the  results  are  corrected  by  an  appeal  to  facts. ^^  But  in  the 
evolutionary  process  to  which  the  naturalist  appeals  in  his 
attempt  to  make  the  data  of  morality,  religion  and  self -con- 
sciousness amenable  to  scientific  formulae,  no  such  empirical 
verification   is  possible.     The   terminus  a  quo   is   the  moral, 

*     "  F.  A.  Fetter,  The  Principles  of  Economics,  p.  22. 

'  "Just  as  in  logic  an  'empirical  division'  is  a  corrected  'logical 
division.'  The  latter  gives  ideal  groups  and  an  appeal  to  experience 
must  be  made  to  eliminate  the  members  of  the  division  that  do  not 
obtain  in  the  economy  of  nature. 


PRINCIPLE  OF  EXTENSION  29 

religious  and  self-conscious  man  as  we  know  him  today;  the 
terminus  ad  quern  is  the  most  primitive  man.  Between  these 
two  termini  there  is  a  clearly  marked  gradational  development. 
Heredity,  social  instinct,  and  environment  explain  to  a  great 
extent  the  progress  man  has  made  in  this  period  in  the  develop- 
ment of  a  monotheistic  religion  and  a  morality  of  oughtness. 
But  in  the  words  of  T.  H.  Green :  "The  most  primitive  man 
they  exhibit  is  already  conscious  of  his  own  good  as  conditioned 
by  that  of  others,  already  capable  of  recognizing  an  obliga- 
tion."^^ So  it  is  also  found  that  the  most  primitive  man  is  self- 
conscious  and  has  a  religion,  however  you  may  define  that 
term.  Morality,  religion  and  self -consciousness  hopelessly 
remove  the  primitive  man  from  the  highest  form  of  animal. 
The  question  is  not  how  these  human  quaUties  have  success- 
ively manifested  themselves  in  history  but  rather  this :  How 
account  for  these  entities  at  all?  It  is  here  that  the  scientist 
has  access  to  that  questionable  personage  called  prehistoric 
man. 

But  now  the  scientist  has  departed  from  his  sure  foothold  of 
^'experimental  reasoning  concerning  matter  of  fact  and  exist- 
ence." He  is  in  a  speculative  realm  where  his  compass  and 
sextant  are  useless.  He  has  pushed  from  the  known  to  the 
unknown.  When  he  again  emerges  on  the  known  animal  plane 
a  great  change  has  taken  place.  He  still  finds  mentality  in  the 
animal,  but  self-consciousness,  with  its  concomitant  capacity  to 
recognize  an  obligation  and  to  worship,  has  been  lost  in  the 
twilight  zone  that  separates  man  from  the  animal.  To  continue 
the  quotation  from  Green :  ''The  theory  of  descent  and  evolu- 
tion opens  up  a  vista  of  possibilities  beyond  the  facts,  so  far* 
ascertained,  of  human  history,  and  suggests  an  enquiry  into 
the  antecedents  of  the  moralized  man  based  on  other  data  than 
the  records  which  he  has  left  of  himself."  Thus,  when  the 
scientist  asserts  that  in  the  amoeba  there  is  potentially  present 
a  consciousness  the  same  in  quality  as  that  in  a  religious  and 
moral  man,  he  must  admit  that  this  conclusion  was  arrived  at 
after  a  long  journey  through  the  wilderness  of  speculative 
thought  where  the  data  of  science — "matter  of  fact  and  ex- 
istence"— were  not  observable  and  therefore  where  the  usual 
scientific  method  was  not  the  sole  guiding  principle. 

^^Prolegomena  to  Ethics^  p.  8. 


30  CRITICISM  OF  DETERMINISM 

B.       BASIC    ASSUMPTIONS 

My  second  observation  is  that  the  basic  assumptions  of 
naturalism  are  hypothetical  and  arbitrary.  The  assumptions 
are  these:  Nature  is  a  complex  but  self-contained  system  in 
which  uniform  laws  prevail  universally ;  in  which  all  change — 
social,  historical  and  economic  included — is  explicable  as  the 
transference  of  energy  from  one  form  or  vehicle  to  another; 
in  which  the  amount  of  energy  is  a  constant  quantity.  In 
brief  the  scientist  postulates  the  "uniformity  of  nature,"  the 
"conservation  of  energy,"  and  the  "inertia  of  matter."  He 
holds  as  absurd  and  inconceivable  that  an  effect  is  produced  by 
anything  but  by  transferred  antecedent  motion;  that  the 
psychical  effectively  projects  into  the  physical;  that  there  is 
an  entity  determined  by  itself  and  not  by  'other.'  The  follow- 
ing quotation  advances  a  position  which  an  unprejudiced  stu- 
dent of  phenomena  must  admit  to  be  at  least  plausible.  To  the 
scientist  the  position  seems  incomprehensible. 

"The  course  of  the  world"  says  Lotze,  "may  every  moment 
have  innumerable  beginnings  whose  origin  lies  outside  it,  but 
can  have  none  not  necessarily  contained  within  it.  Where  such 
beginnings  are  to  be  found  we  cannot  beforehand  say  with 
certainty ;  but  if  experience  convinces  us  that  every  event  of 
external  nature  is  at  the  same  time  an  effect  having  its  cause 
in  preceding  facts,  it  still  remains  possible  that  the  cycle  of 
inner  mental  life  does  not  consist  throughout  of  a  rigid  mechan- 
ism working  necessarily,  but  that  along  with  unlimited  freedom 
of  will  it  also  possesses  a  limited  power  of  unconditional 
commencement."^* 

*  The  psychologist  also  too  often  begins  his  investigations 
%with  rigorous  deterministic  presuppositions,  which  preclude  ab 
^initio  independent  significance  for  psychical  phenomena.  "Psy- 
*  chology,"  writes  Hoeffding,  "must  be  deterministic,  that  is  to 
^  say,  it  must  start  from  the  assumption  that  the  calisal  law  holds 
^good  even  in  the  life  of  the  will,  just  as  the  law  is  assumed  to 
\  be  valid  for  the  remaining  life  and  for  material  nature." 

I  submit  that  such  assumptions  are  arbitrary  and  unwar- 
ranted if  justice  is  to  be  done  to  the  facts,  and  if  any  regard  is 
to  be  had  for  philosophical  method.     Ladd  is  fully  justified 
,  when  in  criticism  of  the  above  passage  he  says:    "Psychology 

"  Microcosmus,  Vol.  I,  p.  261. 


BASIC  ASSUMPTIONS  31 

has  no  right  to  such  assumption;  it  must  stick  to  the  facts  of  • 
consciousness,  discuss  and  describe  them  just  as  they  are,  then,  • 
if  it  can,  explain  them,  but  it  must  not  sophisticate  them.  ♦ 
Among  these  facts  it  finds  the  conscious  and  dehberate  choice.  • 
Its  appearance  is  not  that  of  a  fact  in  which  the  causal  law  • 
holds  good ;  it  is  rather  that  of  a  fact  arising  in  the  mysterious  • 
depth  of  the  self-directing  mind."^^ 

What  are  the  facts  which  the  psychologist  and  the  scientist  • 
find  and  which  they  try  to  force  into  the  formulae  of  physics  ?  * 
There  is,  of  course,  first  of  all  the  great  multiplicity  of  material  * 
phenomena :    the    falling   stone,    the   receding   tide,    chemical  » 
affinities,  geological  strata — in  brief,  physical  action  and  reac-  \ 
tion.    But  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  assume  that  these  manifes-  \ 
tations  constitute  even  the  major  part  of  knowledge  and  ex-   *> 
perience.    There  is  on  the  other  hand  the  amazing  wealth  of 
data  and  fact  furnished  by  history.    In  the  broad  sense  history  " 
is  the  articulated  expression  of  consciousness.     The  conscious  * 
life  of  the  billions,  who  have  inhabited  the  globe,  has  found 
embodiment  in  social  and  religious  institutions,  in  art,  in  litera- 
ture and  in  philosophy.    If  all  the  facts  of  the  physical  sciences 
were  enclosed   in  one  book  and   all  the   facts  of  the   social 
sciences  in  another,  no  one  can  deny  but  that  the  latter  would 
be  much  more  voluminous.    It  is  not  intimated  that  this  state- 
ment proves  or  disproves  anything,  but  it  does  bring  out  a 
fact,  which  the  scientists  only  too  often  ignore,  namely,  that 
there  is  no  preponderance  of  physical  over  social  data. 

If  we  approach  these  records  of  consciousness  without  any 
presuppositions  there  emerge  some  patent  facts.  Human 
history  is  non-repetitive ;  it  is  constituted  of  a  vast  number  of 
unique  individual  acts.  In  as  far  as  these  acts  are  the  ex- 
pression of  rational  beings  they  assume  a  continuity  and  coher- 
ence; but  the  connection  that  binds  them  together  is  different 
from  the  bond  that  unites  physical  phenomena.  Like  M. 
Henri  Bergson's  conception  of  time,  history  is  a  qualitative 
multiplicity,  a  heterogenity  of  elements  that  interpenetrate  and 
commingle  with  one  another. 

There  are  no  a  priori  reasons  why  these  phenomena,  so 
unlike  physical  facts,  should  conform  to  the  same  causal  laws 
observable  in  the  material  world.  The  decision  must  be  arbi- 
trary which  disqualifies  half  the  eligible  players  before  the 

"  Outlines  of  Descriptive  Psychology,  p.  336. 


32  CRITICISM  OF  DETERMINISM 

game  begins.     To  assume  that  the  mental  is  amenable  to  the 

laws  of  physical  science ;  to  assume  that  consciousness  is  equal 

to  Yi   m  v^  is  to  prejudge  the  case.     It  can  be  said  of  the 

naturalist  as  Aristotle  said  of  the  Pythagoreans,  that  they  are 

''forcing  phenomena  into  accordance  with  certain  reasonings 

and  notions  of  their  own."     I  confess  that  I  cannot  see  the 

,  force  of  Prof.  H.  C.  Warren's  logic  when  he  says  :  'The  burden 

tof  proof  rests  on  those  who  deny  the  regularity  and  deter- 

•minacy   of   human   volition   and   human   reasoning."^^      It   is 

•equally  if  not  more  imperative  that  he  establish  that  reason  does 

*not  make  possible  the  regularity  observable  in  nature.^^ 

•  It  must  not  be  understood  that  fault  has  been  found  with 

•  the  scientist  because  he  begins  his  researches  with  definite 
•presuppositions  which  at  the  present  stage  may  still  be  unveri- 

•  fied  hypotheses.  Every  investigation  must  proceed  in  some 
•such  manner.  The  work  and  the  instruments  of  science  are 
%teleological.  Their  object  is  to  subjugate  nature  in  such  a  way 
%that  it  may  become  an  object  of  knowledge  and  a  benefit  to 
^mankind.    To  carry  out  this  purpose  recourse  must  be  had  to 

abstractions — space,  time,  energy,  mass  and  motion.  Most  of 
these  concepts  are  defined  by  the  scientist  in  terms  of  each 
other.  True,  this  does  not  shed  any  light  on-  their  real  nature 
but  for  all  scientific  purposes  such  definition  is  adequate.  As 
long  as  the  scientist  does  not  presume  to  write  a  metaphysic, 
and  admits  that  he  is  only  investigating  a  limited  field  of 
reality — "the  world  of  description"^^ — he  is  making  a  legiti- 
mate use  of  his  abstract  conceptions.  But  when  he  quotes  his 
axioms  and  then  proceeds  to  assert  that,  in  so  far  as  "the 
world  of  appreciation"  cannot  be  subsumed  under  these  cate- 
gories, it  has  no  significance  and  reality,  the  naturalistic  thinker 
makes  an  illegitimate  use  of  his  rubrics  because  he  attempts  to 
apply  them  to  phenomena  beyond  the  scientist's  domain.  It 
need  hardly  be  reiterated  that  the  above-mentioned  axioms  are 
neither  self  evident  nor  necessitated  by  the  laws  of  thought. 
Even  Mill  declared  that  it  was  an  unwarranted  assertion  to 
claim  that  the  principle  of  causation  as  taught  by  science  ob- 
tained in  the  whole  universe. 

"Ibid.,  p.  loo 

"  Cf.  Green,  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  "The  Spiritual  Principle  in 
Knowledge  and  Nature." 

"  Cf.  J.  Royce,  The  Spirit  of  Modern  Philosophy,  Lecture  XII,  "The 
World  of  Description  and  the  World  of  Appreciation." 


BASIC  ASSUMPTIONS 


33 


Let  us  examine  a  little  more  carefully  one  of  these  axioms, 
as  a  typical  case,  in  order  to  get  a  better  conception  of  their 
tentative  character.     I  select  the  principle  of  conservation  of  • 
energy,  because  it  is  so  strongly  maintained  that,  if  a  free  self  • 
determining  entity  were  recognized  in  reality,  the  very  warp  * 
and  woof  of  the  scientific  fabric  would  be  torn  into  shreds. 

Conservation  of  energy  is  defined  thus :  "In  a  system  of  • 
bodies  neither  acted  upon  by,  nor  acting  upon,  anything  outside  * 
of  itself,  the  total  energy  of  the  system  remains  invariable  only  » 
changing  from  one  form  into  another."^®  The  "system"  may 
refer  to  a  clock,  the  earth,  the  solar  system  or  the  universe. 
Reality  consists  of  a  fixed  amount  of  energy  captured  and 
expressed  in  a  "world  formula"  by  science.  If  mind,  which  is  • 
not  a  "system  of  bodies,"  were  so  bound  up  with  matter  as  to  • 
become  an  efficacious  agent,  the  above  principle  would  be  * 
invalidated ;  Shakespeare's  plays  could  no  longer  be  equated  to 
^m  V-,  for  now  the  molecular  motions  of  his  brain  have  been 
supplemented  by  a  spiritual  efficiency.  My  contention  is  that  no 
harm  can  accrue  to  the  conception  of  the  permanency  and 
regularity  of  nature  by  leaving  room  in  the  scientific  pro- 
gramme for  a  dynamic  spiritual  principle.  There  may  well  be 
an  interpenetration  of  the  spiritual  and  the  physical.  When 
once  the  spiritual  has  projected  itself  into  the  realm  of  the 
physical,  where  the  law  of  cause  and  effect  obtains,  the  sup- 
plied energy  would  conform  to  the  laws  of  change  and  transfer- 
ence which  exists  in  that  particular  physical  system.  When  a 
meteor  falls  into  the  ocean  the  configuration  of  the  whole  earth 
is  readjusted  and  the  sum  of  the  mass  particles  on  the  globe 
is  increased  by  the  intrusion  of  a  stranger  from  another 
realm.  But  no  law  of  physics  or  thermodynamics  has  thereby 
been  vitiated.  It  must  be  remembered  that  there  is  a  distinc- 
tion between  the  assertion  that  there  are  constant  mechanical 
equivalents  between  the  various  forms  of  energy,  and  the 
gratuitous  assumption  that  the  quantity  of  energy  in  the  uni- 
verse is  finite  and  invariable.  The  physicist  speaks  of  kinetic, 
potential,  dissipated  and  latent  energy.  Of  latent  energy  we 
know  little  or  nothing;  dissipated  energy  can  never  be  rein- 
stated as  available  power;  potential  energy,  "capacity  for 
capacity  of  work,"  is  not  mechanically  of  the  same  dimension 
as  kinetic  energy.    But  as  yet  no  means  have  been  devised  by 

"Baldwin,  Dictionary  of  Psychology  and  Philosophy. 


34  CRITICISM  OF  DETERMINISM 

which  these  different  forms  of  energy  can  be  accurately  calcu- 
lated and  therefore  we  cannot  dogmatize  about  the  amount  and 
constancy  of  energy  in  the  universe.  Such  a  dogmatic  state- 
ment would  be  as  tenable  as  the  contention  that  the  quantity 
of  water  in  a  lake  must  be  constant  because  the  surface  is 
always  level.  Or  the  attitude  of  the  physicist  might  be  likened 
to  that  of  an  imaginary  economist  who  had  never  heard  of 
production  and  consumption,  but  confined  his  entire  attention  to 
the  study  of  the  laws  of  exchange.  With  an  entire  disregard  of 
the  laws  of  production  and  consumption,  supply  and  demand 
curves  can  be  mathematically  constructed. ^°  ''In  the  grander 
economics  of  nature  the  relations  might  be  similar."  The  forces 
of  the  universe  may  continually  be  enhanced  by  agents  which 
are  not  themselves  part  of  the  mechanistic  system  which  we 
call  nature.  It  may  well  be  that  reality  is  richer  in  content 
than  a  scientific  formula  or  a  logical  concept. 

While,  therefore,  the  physicist  may  tell  us  much  about  the 
behavior  of  mass  particles  in  the  sphere  of  his  observation  and 
while  he  may  formulate  accurately  the  laws  to  which  certain 
kinds  of  energy  conform  as  they  pass  from  one  state  to  another, 
he  can  only  speak  in  hypothetical  terms  when  he  essays  to 
limit  the  bounds  of  reality  by  the  declamation  of  a  few  assumed 
axioms. 

C.       EPISTEMOLOGY 

In  the  third  place  I  submit  that,  when  due  regard  is  given 
to  epistemological  considerations,  it  is  found  that  naturalism 
presupposes — to  use  T.  H.  Green's  phraseology — a  spiritual 
principle  in  nature  which  is  not  a  part  or  product  of  nature, 
in  that  sense  of  nature  in  which  it  is  said  to  be  an  object  of 
knowledge. 

Thus  far  in  our  examination  the  existence,  the  nature,  and 
the  importance  of  the  knower  or  sponsor  of  naturalism  (or  any 
other  ism)  has  not  been  insisted  upon.  It  has  only  been 
urged  that,  when  the  naturalistic  scientist  undertakes  to  give  a 
comprehensive  account  of  reality,  his  methods  and  assumptions 
are  open  to  criticism  and  subject  to  modification.  He  is  un- 
warranted so  to  construe  the  world  that  all  facts  must  be  re- 
duced to  matter  or  motion.     It  has  also  been  indicated  that  no 

**  Illustrations   by  J.   Ward,   Naturalism   and  Agnosticism,   Vol.   II, 

p.  75. 


EPISTE^^IOLOGY 


35 


harm  need  accrue  to  any  of  the  necessary  postulates  of  science 
if  a  causa  eminens  prevails  in  conjunction  with  a  causa 
formalis. 

An  advance  step  now  becomes  imperative.  The  relation  of 
subject  to  object,  of  knower  to  the  thing  known  must  be  care- 
fully surveyed.  What  are  the  necessary  implications  in  the 
process  of  knowing  nature  in  the  scientific  sense  as  a  connected 
system  of  uniform  laws?  Is  the  subject  knowing  any  part  of, 
or  the  sum  of  any  parts  of,  the  concatenated  matters  of  fact  and 
experience  which  are  the  data  of  science?  Is  there  any  validity 
in  Kant's  statement?  ''Macht  zwar  der  Verstand  die  Natur, 
aber  er  schafft  sie  nicht."  When  Huxley  exclaims :  'Tact  I 
know  and  law  I  know"  does  he  not  imply  a  conditioning 
relation  between  the  *T"  and  the  ''fact"  and  "law"? 

In  urging  these  epistemological  questions,  I  am  fully  aware 
of  the  disrepute  into  which  epistemology  has  come  in  some 
philosophical  circles.  Prof.  W.  T.  Marvin  writes  in  all  serious- 
ness :  "Those  who  deny  that  the  theory  of  knowledge  is 
fundamental  believe  that  the  idealists  are  here  guilty  of  a 
grievous  logical  treason  whereby,  through  a  coup  d'etat  a 
perfectly  legitimate  special  science  has  been  raised  by  them 
from  the  humble  rank  of  a  private  citizen  in  the  world  of 
science  to  be  the  infallible  and  supreme  autocrat  and  judge  over 
all  the  other  sciences."-^ 

But  it  is  of  great  importance  to  note  that  epistemology  is 
not  a  "special  science"  at  all,  even  though  it  claims  to  be 
scientific  in  its  method.  A  particular  science  investigates  and 
systematizes  as  far  as  possible  all  the  facts  contained  within  a 
specific  sphere.  Philosophy  (including  epistemology  as  one  of 
its  branches),  assimilating  the  knowledge  furnished  by  the 
special  sciences,  attempts  to  gain  a  new  insight  and  present  a 
more  consistent  conception  of  the  nature  of  reality.  It  is  true 
that  a  man  can  see  without  understanding  the  mechanism  of 
the  eye ;  it  is  true  that  a  man  can  know  without  understanding 

'^  A  First  Book  in  Metaphysics,  p.  204.  Ever  since  the  publication  of 
Locke's  Essay  Concerning  the  Human  Understanding  and  Kant's 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason  there  has  been  a  tendency  to  permit  episte- 
mology to  supplant  metaphysics.  This  tendency,  however,  has  been 
over  emphasized  by  the  Neo-Realists  in  their  vituperative  attacks 
against  epistemology.  Vide  W.  T.  Marvin,  "The  Emancipation  of 
Metaphysics  from  Epistemology,"  in  the  New  Realism. 


36  CRITICISM  OF  DETERMINISM 

the  process  of  knowing;  but  it  is  also  true  that  the  mechanism 
of  the  eye  fixes  the  limits  of  vision  and  that  the  nature  of  the 
cognitive  function  determines  to  a  large  extent  the  measure 
and  nature  of  knowledge.  Epistemology  is  fundamental  to  all 
the  sciences  not  because  of  the  usurpation  of  power,  but  be- 
cause all  the  facts  of  the  sciences  are  obtained  and  systema- 
tized by  the  use  of  the  cognitive  faculty.  The  center  of  the 
circle  is  more  fundamental  than  any  radius  because  all  the 
radii  presuppose  and  must  pass  through  the  center.  Criticism 
is  not  like  an  infallible  autocrat,  ruling  the  philosophic  and 
scientific  domain  with  a  high  hand ;  it  is  better  likened  to  a  light 
house,  which  from  its  natural  point  of  vantage  throws  its 
searching  light  far  out  into  the  distant  future,  beckoning  on- 
ward in  the  right  direction  both  science  and  philosophy. 

This  brief  exposition  of  the  grounds  on  which  a  theory  of 
knowledge  is  justified  is  indispensable  not  only  because  the 
naturalists  usually  ignore  these  considerations  altogether,  but 
also  because  the  epistemological  argument  is  the  most  dis- 
tinctive, and  gives  the  first  assurance  that  reality  contains  a 
genuine  spiritual  element. 

The  old  proverb,  *'As  iron  sharpeneth  iron  so  the  coun- 
tenance of  man  his  fellow,"  nowhere  finds  better  embodiment 
than  in  philosophic  controversies.  Here,  unlike  other  relations 
in  life,  a  man's  dearest  foe  is  his  best  friend.  The  stronger  the 
position  of  the  opponent,  the  better  can  be  displayed  the 
strength  and  the  mettle  of  the  a.ntagonist.  If  there  had  been  no 
Hume  there  might  have  been  no  Kant ;  if  there  were  no  natural- 
ism there  would  be  no  clearly  defined  spiritualism. 

Hume  divided  all  the  objects  of  human  reason  or  inquiry  into 
"relations  of  ideas"  and  "matters  of  fact."  The  former  consti- 
tute intuitive  or  demonstrative  affirmations — the  necessary  log- 
ical implications  of  thought  which  are  formulated  in  mathe- 
matics and  geometry.  The  latter  deal  with  the  so-called 
phenomena  of  nature.  Here  we  deal  only  in  probabilities. 
Hume  clearly  saw  that  the  fundamental  conception  in  nature, 
as  a  connected  series  of  events,  is  causality.  Contiguity,  suc- 
cession and  necessary  connection  are  the  three  essential  ele- 
ments in  causation.  The  first  two  are  explicable  from  the 
data  furnished  by  observation  and  sense  impressions.  In  his 
searching  analysis  Hume  points  out  that  neither  the  cause  nor 
the  effect  can  disclose  the  nexus  that  binds  phenomena  to- 


EPISTEMOLOGY 


37 


gether.  "No  connections,"  says  Hume,  "among  distinct 
existences  are  ever  discovered  by  human  understanding."  To 
explain  then  the  "necessary  connections"  among  phenomena 
Hume  had  recourse  to  the  psychology  of  association,  in  which 
custom  and  experience  account  for  the  delusion  of  causality. 

And  yet  it  is  interesting  to  observe  that  Hume  v^as  dissatis- 
fied with  the  skepticism  to  which  his  position  naturally  led.  He 
admitted  that  the  many  sense  perceptions  were  in  some  way 
unified  in  one  consciousness;  but  this  principle  of  unity  had 
no  significance  for  him.  It  was  Kant  who  developed  Hume's 
vague  feeling  for  a  permanent  unifying  principle  into  the 
"originally  synthetic  unity  of  apperception."  How  close  Hume 
came  to  Kant's  position  in  this  respect  is  significantly  pointed 
out  by  Ward.^^  In  his  Treatise  Hume  says :  "The  human 
mind  is  but  a  system  of  different  perceptions  or  different  exist- 
ences, which  are  linked  together  by  the  relation  of  cause  and 
effect,  and  mutually  produce,  destroy,  influence  and  modify 
each  other."  But  in  the  appendix  to  the  later  editions  of  the 
Treatise  he  confesses :  "But  all  my  hopes  vanish,  when  I 
come  to  explain  the  principles  that  unite  our  successive  per- 
ceptions in  our  thought  and  consciousness." 

It  is  here  that  we  begin  to  find  the  limitations  of  naturalism 
and  its  necessary  termination  in  spiritualism.  If  there  were 
no  unifying  principle  in  consciousness  independent  of  "suc- 
cessive perceptions",  there  could  be  no  T'  and  if  there  were  no 
*r,  there  could  be  no  'facts'  and  4aw,'  for  these  only  become 
common  property  when  related  to  a  consciousness.  There 
can  be  no  naturalism  or  science  which  does  not  presuppose  as 
instrument  of  research  and  formulation  an  element  which  is 
not  naturalistic  in  the  narrow  sense.  In  order  that  science 
may  become  serviceable,  that  thought  may  become  knowledge, 
and  knowledge  power,  there  must  be  permanence  and  certitude. 
But  if  knowledge,  on  the  one  hand,  is  merely  "matters  of  fact" 
i.  e.  successive  sense  perceptions,  it  has  no  coherence  and  uni- 
versality; and  if,  on  the  other  hand,  it  consists  of  "relations 
of  ideas,"  it  has  no  necessary  reality. 

Thus  it  is  realized  that,  since  consciousness  is  at  the  same 
time  equally  present  to  a  series  of  events,  it  cannot  itself  be  a 
part  or  product  of  such  a  series.    In  other  words,  a  knowledge 

^Naturalism  and  Agnosticism,  Vol.  II,  p.  228. 


38  CRITICISM  OF  DETERMINISM 

of  nature  cannot  be  a  part  of  nature.  Triton,  emerging  from 
the  sea  and  apprehending  the  wide  expanse  of  water  with  one 
sweep  of  the  eye,  cannot  be  any  part  or  product  of  the  element 
which  is  native  to  him  and  which  he  has  the  power  to  survey. 
However  far  the  scientist  moves  from  his  starting  point,  he 
is  constrained  to  acknowledge  the  centrality  of  the  knowing  and 
thinking  self ;  to  find  his  irov  arrco  in  Descartes'  Cogito  ergo 
sum.  It  is  a  highly  significant  fact  that  a  scientific  thinker  as 
naturalistic  as  Huxley  should  admit,  *'that  our  one  certainty  is 
the  existence  of  the  mental  world." 

The  genesis  of  knowledge  is  thus  to  be  found  in  conscious- 
ness. It  is  this  spiritual  element  that  construes  nature  and 
gives  meaning  to  it.  It  is  that  organizing  and  form-giving 
element  in  knowledge  which  is  the  basis  of  Kantian  thought. 

The  conceptualizing  process  illustrates  on  a  small  scale  the 
primacy  and  the  nature  of  this  spiritual  element,  whether 
embodied  in  a  finite  self  or  in  the  Absolute.  Through  the 
avenues  of  the  senses  there  come  to  the  mind  various  separate 
sensations,  which  consciousness  unifies  into  a  concept.  Multi- 
plicity is  reduced  to  simplicity.  The  one  emerges  from  the 
many.  This  unifying  principle  in  conscious  experience  finds  its 
ideal  counterpart  in  the  unity  of  nature.  The  function  of 
science  is  to  conceptualize  the  universe.  The  pattern  for  this 
task  is  found  in  the  nature  of  the  scientist's  self-conscious  life. 

Both  logically  and  empirically  the  spiritual  precedes  the 
material.  The  latter  can  only  be  interpreted  in  the  light  of 
the  former.  Consciousness  can  include  nature  but  nature  can- 
not include  consciousness.  The  fallacious  conclusions  of 
naturalism  are  traceable  to  the  fact  that  this  process  is 
reversed.  Der  Verstand  macht  die  Natur  and  not  die  Natur 
d<en  Verstand. 


IV    THEOLOGICAL   DETERMINISM 

If  any  one  doubts  the  all  pervasive  influence  of  fatalism  as 
it  emerges  from  a  naturalistic  world-view,  let  him  read  the 
literature  of  the  day,  e.g.  Zola's,  The  Human  Beast,  Couperus' 
Destiny,  Ibsen's  Ghosts.  Here  is  found  in  new  disguise  the 
inexorable  Molpa  of  the  ancients  and  the  inscrutable  Kismet  of 
the  Oriental,  which  irresistibly  grinds  out  the  minutest  details 
of  human  life  and  seals  the  destiny  of  all^^^ach  man  plays 
his  part,  good  or  bad,  in  conformity  to  the  deposit  that  has 
come  to  him  from  untold  ancestors,  and  in  response  to  the 
particular  environment  in  which  he  happens  to  exist.  There  is 
no  real  merit  or  demerit.  Goodness  and  badness,  heroism 
and  cowardice,  crime  and  virtue  are  essentially  meaningless 
distinctions.  A  cynical  skepticism  and  a  petrifying  resignation 
sap  the  life  and  energy  of  the  individual  and  social  institutions. 
External  props  are  invented  to  sustain  the  tottering  life^ 

Of  course,  if  such  a  philosophy  were  true,  it  would  be  mcum- 
bent  humbly  to  submit  to  our  tragic  fate.  In  our  investigation 
thus  far,  however,  we  have  found  reasons  for  the  conviction 
tha^Ahere  is  in  man  a  principle  of  personality  which  is  beyond 
the  reach  of  scientific  mechanism.  There  is  encouragement 
for  the  belief  that  in  the  realm  of  selfhood  there  is  room  for 
freedom,  morality  and  real  worthyr  If  such  an  individual  self 
is  the  unit  of  our  social,  religious  and  political  institutions, 
then  our  attitude  toward  practical  problems  must  adjust  itself 
accordingly.  If  each  unit  has  creative  power  and  can  actually 
effect  change,  and  if  the  consciousness  of  this  fact  becomes 
universal,  a  great  dynamic  force  will  at  once  disclose  itself. 
The  emancipation  from  undue  bondage  to  heredity  and  en- 
vironment will  be  a  great  transforming  power. 

But  when  the  thinker  has  found  his  way  through  mechanism 
into  the  realm  of  spiritual  reality,  he  is  by  no  means  assured 
a  safe  retreat  from  the  stern  mastery  of  necessity.  Perchance 
he  turns  to  idealistic  philosophy  or  theology  and  to  his  amaze- 
ment finds  himself  in  the  clutches  of  a  new  mechanism, 
euphemistically  styled  soft  determinism. 

39 


40  CRITICISM  OF  DETERMINISM 

It  is  a  significant  fact  that  practically  all  reformed  theology^ 
with  the  single  exception  of  Arminianism,  is  strictly  determin- 
istic. The  necessarianism  of  St.  Augustine,  John  Calvin  and 
Jonathan  Edwards  maintains  its  integrity  in  the  official  creed 
of  most  denominations.  The  poet  has  well  portrayed  their 
position : 

"With  earth's  first  clay  they  did  the  last  man  knead, 
And  there  of  the  last  harvest  sowed  the  seed, 
And  the  first  morning  of  creation  wrote 
What  the  last  dawn  of  reckoning  shall  read." 

To  be  sure  the  doctrine  of  predestination  has  retreated  into 
seclusion  in  many  quarters,  yet  it  still  remains  the  theoretical 
basis  of  much  religious  teaching.     The  inimical  result  in  the 
first  instance  does  not  issue  from  the  actual  influences  of  a 
spiritual  deterministic  world-view  but  from  the  fact  that,  in  an 
age  of  naturalistic  fatalism,  the  church  has  no  positive  counter- 
acting influence,  which  can  break  the  bonds  of  necessity  and 
restore  man  to  his  legitimate  sphere  of  self-initiation.     Little 
comfort  can  be  obtained  by  postulating  a  supreme  Deity,  who 
has  constructed  the  loom  and  devised  the  pattern  of  the  net  and 
decreed  the  weaving  of  every  loop.     To  the  many,  who  are 
destined  ever  to  be  misfits  in  the  cosmic  process,  a  theistic 
.  determinism  is  sheer  mockery.    "The  chain  of  Fate"  says  Dr. 
»  Henry  van  Dyke,  "is  not  made  less  heavy  by  fastening  the  end 
( of  it  to  the  distant  throne  of  an  omnipotent  and  impassive  Cre- 
r.ator.    If  our  false  sense  of  freedom  comes  from  such  a  Being, 
%  who  is  Himself  free,  it  is  all  the  more  a  cruel  and  bitter  enigma. 
,   .If  moral  responsibility  has  been  imposed  upon  us  by  the    same 
I  ,  hand  which  has  bound  us  to  an  inalterable  destiny,  it  is  all  the 
.  more  a  crushing  and  miserable  fraud.    To  baptize  fatalism  with 
\   »  a  Christian  name  does  not  change  its  nature.    To  hold  fast  to 
♦  the  metaphysical  conception  of  God  while  accepting  heredity 
.and  environment  as  His  only  and  infallible  prophets  is  simply 
V  to  add  a  new  ethical  horror  to  the  dismal  delusion  of  life, 
«  and  to  fall  back  into  the  pessimism  of  Omar  Khayyam."^ 

The  above  quotation  makes  the  challenge  that  there  is  little 
to  choose  between  a  theistic  and  a  naturalistic  determinism. 
The  one  may  be  blind  and  the  other  intelligent,  but  my  help- 

'^The  Gospel  for  an  Age  of  Doubt,  pp.  216,  217. 


THEOLOGICAL  DETERMINISM  41 

lessness  in  both  is  the  same,  and  both  are  equally  inscrutable  to 
me.  The  one  may  have  a  purposed  end  in  view,  but  the  good 
is  realized  by  a  tremendous  waste  of  human  souls. 

The  inadequacy  of  atomistic  mechanism  and  theistic  finalism, 
because  of  an  underlying  similarity,  has  been  brought  out  very 
forcibly  by  a  modern  thinker  who  approaches  the  problem  from 
a  different  point  of  view.  His  criticism  of  the  two  positions  is 
significant  because  it  confirms  the  opinion  that  a  theology 
which  is  itself  deterministic  can  never  successfully  combat  the 
dispiriting  influence  of  naturalism,  which  denies  to  man  the 
power  of  self-control  and  the  power  effectively  to  change  his 
condition.  In  working  out  a  philosophy,  culminating  in  a  free 
self,  M.  Henri  Bergson  begins  his  construction  with  a  chapter 
on  mechanism  and  teleology.  He  points  out  that  both  positions, 
as  now  understood,  are  equally  disastrous.  If  we  substitute 
"theological  determinism"  for  "radical  finalism"  his  conclusion 
sheds  light  on  our  present  problem. 

"Radical  mechanism  implies  a  metaphysic  in  which  the 
totality  of  the  real  is  postulated  complete  in  eternity,  and  in 
which  the  apparent  duration  of  things  expresses  merely  the 
infirmity  of  a  mind  that  cannot  know  everything  at  once.  But 
duration  is  something  very  different  from  this  for  our  con- 
sciousness, that  is  to  say  for  that  which  is  most  indispensible  in 
our  experience.  We  perceive  duration  as  a  stream  against 
which  we  cannot  go.  It  is  the  foundation  of  our  being,  and,  as 
we  feel,  the  very  substance  of  the  world  in  which  we  live. 
"But  radical  finalism  is  quite  as  unacceptable  and  for  the  same 
reason.  The  doctrine  of  teleology,  in  its  extreme  form,  as  we 
find  it  in  Leibnitz  for  example,  implies  that  things  and  beings 
merely  realize  a  programme  previously  arranged.  But  if  there 
is  nothing  unforeseen,  no  invention  or  creation  in  the  universe, 
time  is  useless  again.  As  in  the  mechanistic  hypothesis,  here 
again  it  is  supposed  that  all  is  given.  Finalism  thus  understood 
is  only  inverted  mechanism.  It  springs  from  the  same  postulate. 
It  substitutes  the  attraction  of  the  future  for  the  impulsion  of 
the  past"^ 

CALVINISM  AND  FATALISM 

Thus  far  it  has  been  more  or  less  tacitly  assumed  that  theo-* 
logical  determinism  is  in  the  last  analysis  fatalism  and  equally 

^Creative  Evolution,  translation  by  A,  Mitchell,  p.  39- 


42  CRITICISM  OF  DETERMINISM 

» subversive  of  morality  and  real  endeavor.  However,  it  is  well 
.known  that  predestinarians  truculently  repudiate  the  idea  of 
.fatalism.  Their  position  implies  certainty  but  not  necessity. 
Not  to  make  this  distinction  is  ignorantly  to  put  Hobbes  and 
Edwards  under  the  same  rubric ;  to  establish  a  kinship  between 
Calvinism  and  Islamism.  That  there  is  some  difference  between 
the  two  isms  no  one  ventures  to  deny,  but  just  what  this  dis- 
tinction is,  and  what  relation  this  distinction  has  to  responsi- 
bility, freedom  and  other  germane  subjects,  is  a  most  important 
question.  The  following  comparison  brings  out  clearly  the 
claimed  relation  between  fatalism  or  hard  determinism,  and 
Calvinism  or  soft  determinism. 

The  points  in  which  they  agree: 

1.  Whatever  comes  to  pass  God  has  foreordained. 

2.  What  God  has  foreordained  is  certain  and  necessary. 

3.  The  ultimate  grounds  of  the  decrees  are  in  God  and  never 

in  the  objects  of  the  decrees. 

The  points  in  which  they  differ : 

1.  Relation  of  God  to  evil: 

A.  In  the  fatalistic  conception  God's  relation  to  evil  is 
the  same  as  to  good,  i.  e.  God  is  the  efficient  cause  of 
both. 
*       B.  In  the  Calvinistic  conception  God  is  the  efficient  cause 
of  good,  but  has  only  a  permissive  relation  to  evil. 

2.  Method  of  carrying  out  decrees: 

A.  In   the   Calvinistic   conception   God   carries   out   His 
^            decrees  in  reference  to  the  powers  and  nature  of  the 

object  of  the  decree.     If  an  individual  is  to  be  saved 
God  makes  him  willing  to  be  saved.     If  he  is  to  be 

•  lost  God  hardens  his  heart  so  that  he  is  not  willing  to 
%  be  saved.     The  decrees  are  carried  out  on  the  basis 

♦  of  character  and  justice. 

B.  In  the  fatalistic  conception  God  carries  out  His  decrees 
without  reference  to  the  powers  and  nature  of  the 
object  of  the  decree.  The  methods  are  arbitrary,  and 
are  not  based  on  character  or  justice.  God  acts  on 
the  individual  without  first  making  him  assent  to  the 
result  which  is  to  be  produced. 

The  essential  difference  between  the  two  positions   is  the 
character  they  attribute  to  the  Deity.    This  amounts  to  saying 


THEOLOGICAL  DETERMINISM  43 

that  the  Deity  reveals  his  character  by  his  purpose  and  by  the 
method  he  selects  to  bring  his  plans  to  fruition. 

The  crux  of  the  situation  is  found  in  the  nature  of  man's 
role  in  the  rendition  of  God's  programme.    The  fatalist  knows 
only  determination  by  'other'.    He  makes  an  abrupt  diremption 
between  himself  and  the  causes  which  determine  his  action. 
"His  outward  circumstances  and  inward  acts  are  all  equally 
determined  by  an  inexorable  law  or  influence  residing  out  of 
himself."^     As  contrasted  with  this  procedure,  the  Calvinist* 
affirms  a  jd/-'determination.     The  self  that  chooses  may  be ' 
determined  by  'other'  but  the  present  choice  is  always  deter-' 
mined  by  'self.    The  remote  antecedents  of  all  actions  coalesce  » 
in   God,   but   the   immediate   determinants   of   any   particular  * 
choice  are  the  complex  constituents  of  the  whole  self.     There  * 
is  still,  at  least  remotely,  determination  by  'other'  but  there  is  • 
also  acquiescent  determination  by  'self. 

Christian  self-determinism  displays  here  a  keen  psychological 
analysis.  Motivation  is  indisputably  the  universal  law  of 
choice.*  The  following  are  its  characteristics :  ( i )  All  motiva- 
tion is  immanent.  Before  anything  can  become  operative  in 
moving  the  will  it  must  first  assume  the  nature  of  internal 
energy.  It  must  become  indigenous  to  the  mental  life  of  a 
self-conscious  individual.  (2)  All  choice  displays  a  selective 
character.  The  self  functioning  in  volition  projects  itself  in 
one  direction  in  preference  to  another.  The  one  is  left,  the 
other  is  taken.  "And  selection  of  alternatives  involves  a  two- 
sided  process,  conscious  annulment  of  ends  as  well  as  conscious 
self -commitment  to  the  end  that  is  chosen."  (3)  Every  normal 
conative  process  has  the  power  of  arrest.  Through  the  faculty 
of  attention  the  fragments  of  the  scattered  self  can  be  col- 
lected before  the  self  moves  from  one  state  to  another. 

An  examination  of  consciousness,  when  volition  takes  place, 
substantiates  this  analysis.  The  testimony  for  free  agency 
seems  universal,  and,  therefore,  the  self-determining  agent  is 
morally  and  legally  responsible  for  his  acts.  In  this  sense  it  is 
claimed  self-determinism  provides  the  kind  of  freedom  that  is 
required  as  an  ethical  postulate.  In  this  respect  Calvinism  is  a 
distinct  advance  on  the  Islamic  or  fatalistic  conception  of  the 

*  Hodge,  Systematic  Theology,  Vol.  II,  p.  280. 

*  Cf.  A.  T.  Ormond,  Freedom  and  Psycho-Genesis,  "Princeton  Con- 
tributions to  Psychology,"  Vol.  I,  p.  31. 


44 


CRITICISM  OF  DETERMINISM 


self.     But  the  exact  nature  of  the  freedom  attained  by  this 

advance  must  be  examined. 

••    "It  may  be  demonstrated/'  says  Prof.  A.  T.  Ormond,  ''that 

•  the  present  choice  is  self-determined,  and  at  the  same  time  the 

•  self  that  chooses  may  be  predetermined  by  its  antecedents.  We 
•may  thus  escape  fatalism  and  still  find  ourselves  in  the  clutches 
*of  necessity".^    The  vital  question  is  whether  this  necessity  is 

•  sufficiently  attenuated  to  change  its  real  character  by  removing 
I  it  one  step,  grounding  it  in  God,  and  then  calling  it  certainty. 

An  end  obtained  by  the  compulsion  of  a  self-conscious  Deity  is 
on  that  account  a  no  less  binding  necessity  than  the  result  made 
necessary  by  the  compulsion  of  any  other  force.  ''A  man  is 
free,"  writes  Hodge,  "so  long  as  his  volitions  are  the  conscious 
expression  of  his  own  mind;  or  so  long  as  his  activity  is 
determined  and  controlled  by  his  reason  and  feelings."^  But, 
whence  came  his  mind,  his  individuality,  his  character,  his 
whole  self,  which  at  any  moment  makes  a  choice?  Clearly 
these  manifestations  are  traceable  to  heredity  and  environment. 
This  fact  the  naturalistic  thinker  points  out  with  great  avidity. 
If  you  adhere  to  a  theistic  position,  you  widen  the  meaning  of 
the  two  terms  so  as  to  admit  an  efficacious  spiritual  heredity 
and  spiritual  environment.  God  controls  the  factors  and  thus 
obtains  any  desired  result. 

At  this  point,  however,  the  problem  transcends  psychology, 
for  the  individual  has  no  consciousness  of  the  actual  nature  and 
origin  of  his  mental  stock.  God,  who  determines  and  fore- 
ordains a  man's  original  character  as  well  as  his  environment, 
is  able,  without  any  apparent  intrusion  into  the  realm  of  self- 
hood, to  make  necessary,  that  is  to  predestine,  every  choice  and 
every  act  of  the  individual.  In  this  way  it  is  claimed  that  human 
freedom  and  predestination  are  reconciled.  God's  sover- 
eignty is  maintained  without  taxing  out  of  existence  freedom 
and  responsibility.  The  individual  agent,  on  the  one  hand,  has 
the  consciousness  and  conviction  of  sin,  freedom  and  responsi- 
bility ;  the  Deity,  on  the  other,  from  eternity  has  foreordained, 
made  necessary  and  certain  all  things,  good  and  bad,  that  dis- 
close themselves  in  the  current  of  moving  time. 

V&tU,  p.  34. 

VHrf.,  Vol.  II.  p.  288. 


THEOLOGICAL  DETERMINISM  45 

THEOLOGICAL  SELF-DETERMINISM 

What  pragmatic  and  metaphysical  significance  has  this  "con- 
sciousness and  conviction  of  freedom"  which  obtains  in  the 
theologian's  self-determined  agent?  In  the  narrow  sense  it 
has  a  unique  pragmatic  value.  Granted  the  fact  of  self-deter- 
minism, the  foundation  is  ready  for  the  construction  of  many 
practical  institutions,  even  though  it  may  afford  no  foundation 
at  all  for  the  construction  of  a  Weltanschauung.  Viewed  from 
this  limited  standpoint  I  can,  at  least  partially,  agree  with 
Rashdall's  statements :  '*An  act  inspired  by  such  and  such  a 
character  is  good,  no  matter  what  be  the  historical  explanation 
of  the  genesis  of  such  a  character."  "If  it  be  true  that  the 
value  of  good  character  and  conduct  is  not  really  affected  by 
the  question  of  its  genesis,  it  is  impossible  that,  except  under 
the  influence  of  intellectual  confusion,  any  doctrine  as  to  that 
genesis  could  destroy  or  weaken  any  reason  for  moral  effort 
which  I  can  possibly  give  to  myself  or  urge  upon  another.  For 
purely  ethical  purposes  we  need  not  look  beyond  the  immediate 
cause  of  the  acts."'^  The  real  implication  and  meaning  of 
Rashdall's  attempt  to  separate  ethics  and  moral  conduct  from 
their  genetic  or  ultimate  ground  is  very  candidly  betrayed  by 
Abbe  Ferdinand  Galiani  when  he  says :  "The  conviction  ofj^ 
freedom  is  not  the  same  thing  as  freedom  but  it  produces  • 
absolutely  the  same  thing  in  morals.  The  conviction  of* 
freedom  is  all  that  is  wanted  to  establish  a  conscience,* 
remorse,  justice,  rewards,  and  punishments;  it  answers  every '^ 
purpose."®  ^ — ^ 

Granted  that  this  statement  were  true,  such  a  pseudo-freedom* 
could  never  permanently  satisfy  the  conscientious  thinker  who* 
demands  consistency  between  thinking  and  living,  and  coher-  * 
ency  in  his  conception  of  reality  as  a  whole.    It  is  not  the  "in-  • 
fluence  of  intellectual  confusion"  but  rather  the  influence  of 
intellectual  clarification  that  demands  an  ultimately  genetic  or 
metaphysical  grounding  for  "purely  ethical  purposes,"  moral 
effort,  and  character.     You  may  call  a  character  good  or  bad 
or  designate  an  act  vicious  or  virtuous  without  raising  the 
question  regarding  the  genesis  of  the  character  or  the  act; 
but  the  mere  attribution  of  a  moral  quality  to  an  act  or  charac- 

'  The  Theory  of  Good  and  Evil,  Vol.  II,  pp.  330,  331,  340. 

•  Quoted  by  Martineau,  A  Study  of  Religion,  Vol.  II,  p.  322. 


L 


46  CRITICISM  OF  DETERMINISM 

-ter  can  never  become  a  real  basis  for  Christian  ethics.  Such  an 
^ethics  always  has,  and  I  may  venture  to  say  must  have,  an 
•nought  in  its  system.  But  if  ''all  is  given"  and  the  individual, 
^though  self-determined,  is  but  a  resultant  of  the  Deity's  own 

*  determination  for  him,  it  is  a  ludicrous,  not  to  say  a  pathetic 

♦  figure  of  speech,  to  insist  that  the  individual  ought  to  change 
%his  course  or  to  conform  to  some  standard,  for  at  any  and 

•  every  moment  in  his  career  he  is  precisely  what  his  remote 
.antecedents  have  made  him.  If  God  absolutely  fixes  and  fore- 
ordains before  my  birth  every  influence  that  will  play  on  my 
life  so  as  to  produce  certain  good  or  bad  predestined  acts ;  if, 
therefore,  I  have  no  inherent  power  to  effect  a  change  in  my 
condition  or  to  alter  circumstances,  my  metaphysical  status  is 
not  changed  because  I  am  ignorant  of  the  genetic  factors  which 
have  produced  me,  and  because  I  am  deluded  into  construing 
my  so-called  self-determination  as  real  freedom. 

I  can  hypnotize  my  friend  and  suggest  to  him  that  at  a 
certain  hour  on  the  next  day  he  will  perform  a  specific  act,  e.  g. 
remove  a  calendar  from  the  wall.  At  the  appointed  time  my 
friend,  unconscious  of  the  mandate  given  to  him  the  day 
before,  in  a  very  natural  manner  removes  the  calendar.  The 
act  was  not  unmotived.    It  found  its  place  in  a  legitimate  way 

•  in  the  normal  current  of  his  self-conscious  life.  For  all  prac- 
•tical  purposes  the  act  was  a  self-determined  expression  of  the 
•agent,  but  the  constraining,  even  though  unconscious,  necessity 
•robbed  the  self-determination  of  all  significant  freedom.  If  in 
•■a  similar  way  an  agent  could  be  compelled  to  commit  a  crime,  no- 
»Qne  would  venture  to  assert  that  the  act  had  any  moral  quality. 

rAnd  the  hypnotist's  defense  would  not  be  strengthened  in  the 
least  by  the  euphemistic  statement  that  he  merely  permitted 

\  the  agent  to  commit  the  crime  and  that  he  was  not  himself  the 
efficient  cause  of  the  crime. 

^'"''''^  If  the  Deity,  however  wise  and  good,  with  hands  shielded 
by  secondary  causes,  thus  supplies  and  determines  every  ante- 
cedent that  can  become  an  efficient  factor  in  life  and  character, 
then  the  self  does  not  ultimately  retain  any  more  important 
role  nor  does  it  possess  any  more  real  freedom  than  it  would" 
possess  under  a  strictly  fatalistic  regime.  The  conclusion 
seems  inevitable.  If  things  are  necessarily  determined,  as  to 
their  origin  and  outcome,  even  before  the  agent  emerges  on 
the  scene  of  action,  stern  necessity  is  not  mollified  by  threshing 


THEOLOGICAL  DETERMINISM 


47 


data  through  a  self-conscious  machine  even  though  it  puts  its 
stamp  of  approval  on  every  grain. 

Let  me  summarize  briefly.  Our  moral  consciousness  demands  » 
freedom,  finds  it,  asserts  it,  and  lives  by  it.  We  assume  respon-  r 
sibility  for  our  conduct.  Penology  is  based  on  this  assumption.  * 
Evil  is  hard  to  bear  but  it  is  not  enigmatical  to  the  individual  in  « 
his  own  domain.  The  self  charges  both  the  good  and  the  bad  * 
to  its  own  account.  If  the  testimony  of  consciousness  is  true,  * 
neither  in  theory  nor  in  practice  are  we  fatalists. 

But  the  theologian  and  the  metaphysician  must  take  a  more  • 
comprehensive  view  than  that  afforded  by  the  individual,  who 
is  conscious  of  his  self-determination  and  therefore  of  his 
freedom.  The  'many'  are  inconceivable  without  some  underly- 
ing unity.  Theism  has  established  God  as  the  ultimate  ground  i 
of  things.  But  God  to  be  God  must  possess  attributes  infinite 
in  their  quality.  To  be  supreme  and  not  merely  primus  inter 
pares  He  must  be  the  actual  and  efficient  agent  of  all  that  comes 
to  pass.  The  unrolling  of  events  from  the  scroll  of  time  is 
but  the  manifestation  of  His  eternal  decrees.  All  must  be  pre- 
destined from  the  beginning  else  the  Absolute  could  be  taken  by 
surprise  as  history  evolved.  He  would  not  be  omniscient  and 
omnipotent  if  He  did  not  foreordain  and  foreknow  all  things. 

Here,  however,  the  metaphysical  conception  of  God  trenches 
on  the  territory  which  in  the  beginning  of  our  investigation 
was  reserved  for  the  plurality  of  finite  selves.    In  such  a  fixed 
and  ''block  universe,"  as  James  calls  it,  there  is  no  elbow  room 
for  a  self-initiating  and  free  agent.    This  is  a  problem  as  old 
as  philosophy  itself.     Can  the  absolutely  determined  plans  of 
God  so  filter  through  the  human  soul  that  the  emerging  result, 
if  good,  enhances  the  real  moral  worth  of  the  individual,  or  if 
bad,  bespeaks  moral  delinquency  and  blame?     I  confess,  that* 
the  process  seems  logically  hopeless.     The  kind  of  self-deter-« 
mination,  or  free  agency,  that  such  a  process  permits,  I  have  ' 
tried  to  point  out,  retains  no  essentially  significant  freedom.* 
Pragmatically  it  is  better  than  fatalism,  metaphysically  it  is  * 
worse.    Again  if  God  has  determined  all,  and  man  has  no  real 
creative  ability,  God  is  ultimately  chargeable  with  sin.    To  say 
that  He  merely  permits  sin  is  a  meaningless  evasion,  since  the 
agent,  in  w^hom  the  sin  is  permitted,  is  the  determined  product 
of  the  Permitter. 

There  seems  to  be  a  hopeless  conflict  between  the  free  'many' 


48  CRITICISM  OF  DETERMINISM 

and  the  omnipotent  'One',  and  this  has  always  been  recognized. 
In  theology  there  are  on  the  one  side  Pelagius,  Arminius  and 
Wesley;  on  the  other  Augustine,  Calvin  and  Edwards.  The 
former  begin  with  man  and  his  freedom  and  find  a  God  who 
does  not  conflict  with  this  conception.  The  latter  begin  with  a 
sovereign  God  and  conclude  with  a  man  shorn  of  all  real 
power  and  freedom.  Is  there  a  via  media  between  the  two 
apparently  conflicting  positions?  I  believe  that  God  and  free 
creative  selves  are  not  contradictory  terms.  To  vindicate  this 
is  the  purpose  of  the  following  discussion. 


V    THE  NATURE  OF  THE  SELpi 

The  ultimate  nature  of  the  self  opens  a  realm  where  the 
unwary  fall  into  many  pitfalls.  In  a  short  sketch  one  can 
merely  present  the  salient  features  of  a  conclusion  whose 
roots  are  deeply  embedded  in  metaphysics.  For  our  immediate 
purpose,  therefore,  many  things  may  be  taken  for  granted.  In 
the  criticism  of  naturaUsm  the  primacy  of  a  spiritual  principle 
in  reality  was  vindicated.  In  the  examination  of  theological 
determinism  we  accepted  a  plurality  of  selves  and  the  unifying 
supreme  Intelligence  that  is  implied  by  these  finite  agents. 
There  are  finite  personalities  and  there  is  an  infinite  Person- 
ality. We  admitted  the  validity  of  the  psychological  analysis 
and  other  evidence  adduced  to  establish  a  self-determined  agent 
i.  e.  one  in  whom  there  is  some  ultimacy;  but  we  rejected  that 
kind  of  blind  self-determination,  styled  theological,  in  which 
the  acts  of  the  agent  are  swallowed  up  by  the  predestinating 
Deity.  What  then  are  the  features  of  a  free  self-determination 
which  is  significant  and  at  the  same  time  does  not  dethrone  the 
Infinite  ? 

Man  in  his  essence  is  an  unfinished  piece  of  reality.  He  is  the 
creation^  of  God — made  in  his  image — ^but  very  unlike  his 
other  creations.  Things  are  the  phenomena  of  life;  they  are 
the  transmitters  of  forces ;  they  are  the  bearers  of  transeunt 
causality ;  they  integrate  and  disintegrate  without  essential  loss 
or  gain :  selves,  on  the  other  hand,  both  are  and  partly  produce 
phenomena  of  life;  they  are  real  centers  of  force;  in  them 
inheres  immanent  causality;  by  their  cooperation  they  enhance 
the  spiritual  efficiency  of  the  world.^ 

*C/.  James.  Psychology,  Chapter  IX,  "The  Stream  of  Thought"; 
Chapter  X,  "The  Consciousness  of  Self."  J.  Ward,  The  Realm  of 
Ends.  H.  Bergson,  Time  and  Free  Will,  Translation  by  F.  L.  Pogson, 
W.  E.  Hocking,  The  Meaning  of  God  in  Human  Experience,  Chapter 
XVII,  "The  Knowledge  of  other  Minds  than  Our  Own." 

^  Cf.  J.  Ward,  The  Realm  of  Ends,  Supplementary  Notes,  "Dr. 
Howison  on  Creation,"  p.  455. 

'  In  this  mutual  labor  Wundt  finds  the  fundamental  law  of  spiritual 
life,  i.  e.     "The  increase  of  spiritual  energy"  as  contrasted  with  the 

49 


50  CRITICISM  OF  DETERMINISM 

"Our  human  life"  says  Professor  W.  E.  Hocking,  '4s  only 
an  apprenticeship  in  creativity."  The  creative  power  is  a  gift 
from  God  and  distinguishes  man  from  other  animals.  The 
animal  with  formative  instincts  uses  natural  organized  instru- 
ments to  remake  his  environment;  man  with  creative  intelli- 
gence uses  self-made  instruments  to  bring  into  being  a  new 
environment.*  This  faculty  in  man,  however,  is  limited  in 
many  ways.  God  creates  the  original  stuff  and  gives  it  form; 
man  can  exercise  his  powers  only  on  ready-made  material. 
Again,  man  is  begirt  with  the  more  or  less  fixed  conditions  of 
heredity  and  environment.  But  within  this  realm  there  is 
afforded  to  him  a  wide  range  of  creative  freedom.  If  properly 
understood,  the  mechanism  with  which  the  self  seems  be- 
leagured  becomes  the  "handmaid  of  teleology"  and  furthers 
the  immanent  end.  "Heredity,"  says  Prof.  A.  T.  Ormond, 
"conserves  the  end  by  preserving  and  transmitting  the  gains  of 
individual  experience,  while  the  environing  forces  supply  the 
necessary  stimuli  of  development.  .  .  .  But  free  self  deter- 
mination is  the  end  which  all  this  hard  and  forbidding-looking 
mechanism  has  had  at  heart  and  has  been  realizing  from  the 
beginning."^ 

*  James,  in  his  psychological  analysis  of  the  self,  points  out 
\            *how  a   creative  selection   operates   in   every    function   of   the 

omental  process.®     As  far  as  perception  is  a  voluntary  activity 

♦  the  self  accentuates  or  subordinates  sensations;  it  displays 
preference  or  dislike  to  the  multifarious  data  that  come  into 
consciousness.  The  same  directive  power  is  exercised  in  rea- 
soning. Rationality  is  expressed  by  disintegrating  the  "totality 
of  phenomena  reasoned  about."  The  selected  and  significant 
parts  are  then  synthetized  so  as  to  substantiate  the  desired  con- 
clusion. It  is,  therefore,  not  at  all  inappropriate  if  one  should 
speak  of  the  freedom  of  perception  and  the  freedom  of  the 
reason. 

It  is,  however,  in  the  realm  of  aesthetics  and  ethics  that 
man's  creative  powers  come  to  real  fruition.    The  good  and  the 

fixed    quantum    of    physical    energy.      Cf.    System    der    Philosophie, 
"Wachsthum  der  geistigen  Energie." 

*  Cf.  H.  Bergson,  Creative  JEvolution,  p.   147,  fif. 
'^  Ibid.,  p.  42. 

*  So    also    Baldwin.      Cf.    Development    and    Evolution,    "Selective 
Thinking."    p.  238. 


THE  NATURE  OF  THE  SELF 


51 


beautiful  are  very  closely  related.  ''Every  decision  is  a  work 
of  art."  If  the  function  of  art  is  the  revelation  of  reality,  then, 
it  matters  little  whether  the  real  is  disclosed  in  a  beaiitifiti 
character  or  a  good  painting.  No  violence  is  done  if  the 
adjectives  are  interchanged,  for  the  good  character  and  the 
beautiful  painting  are  both  the  product  of  a  creative  self. 
Each  personality  stands  in  a  unique  relation  to  the  rest  of 
reality  and,  therefore,  has  a  point  of  view  and  a  conception 
that  is  only  obtainable  from  that  particular  angle. 

Every  social  and  political  institution  is  a  work  of  art  to 
which  each  member  has  contributed  his  distinctive  share. 
Every  ballot  is  a  stroke  of  the  brush.  Every  reformer 
is  an  art  critic.  The  purpose  of  government  is  so  to 
individualize  each  civic  artist  that,  unhampered,  he  may 
socialize  his  personality.  The  fault  in  collectivism,  and  in 
socialism  in  particular,  is  that  they  try  to  socialize  man  at  the 
expense  of  his  individuality.  That  man  is  a  political  animal  is 
a  truth  as  old  as  Aristotle,  but  the  Greek  philosopher  also 
taught  that  he  is  more  than  a  mere  member  of  an  organization. 
The  sum  of  a  man  is  not  the  added  result  of  his  social  and 
trade  relations.  He  is  also  a  super-social  animal.  The  con- 
ception that  each  self  is  a  creative  being,  an  unfinished  piece  of 
reality,  makes  this  fact  plain.  The  finishing  of  such  realities 
is  greatly  aided  by  organized  society  and,  therefore,  such 
society  is  indispensable.  But  no  institution  or  collection  of 
institutions  can  complete  this  finishing  process.  Free  play  must 
be  given  the  individual  to  perform  the  task  by  himself.  Society 
builds  the  foundation,  the  individual  must  rear  the  super- 
structure. 

We  decry  the  fact  of  machine-made  men.  Much  can  be 
done  to  better  external  conditions,  but  the  essential  thing  is  to 
teach  man  his  innate  power  to  rise  superior  to  his  inherited 
environment.  What  the  individual  is  depends  on  society,  and 
what  society  is  depends  on  the  individual.  This  is  paradoxical 
but  true.  Society  can  never  rise  higher  than  its  source,  i.  e. 
its  members,  but  the  individual  may  continue  to  make  attain- 
ment after  his  social  relations  have  made  their  last  contribution. 
Ultimately  each  man  must  work  out  his  own  salvation.  When 
his  external  relations  are  exhausted  or  when  they  thwart  his 
purpose,  there  still  remains  the  ''intensive  cultivation"  of  his 
moral  domain.     Man  has  a  relation  to  God  as  well  as  to  his 


52 


CRITICISM  OF  DETERMINISM 


fellows.  After  much  convincing  evidence  Dr.  Hazard,  in 
speaking  of  this  realm  of  man's  activity,  concludes : 

"We  may  more  confidently  than  before  deduce  the  conclusion, 
that  the  mind  in  the  sphere  of  its  own  moral  nature,  applying 
an  infalHble  knowledge  which  it  possesses  to  material  purely  its 
own,  may  conceive  an  ideal  moral  creation  and  then  realize  this 
ideal  in  an  actual  creation  by  and  in  its  own  act  of  will;  and 
hence,  when  willing  in  the  sphere  of  his  own  moral  nature, 
man  is  not  only  a  creative  first  cause,  but  a  supreme  creative 
first  cause ;  and,  as  his  moral  nature  can  be  affected  only  by  his 
own  act  of  will,  and  no  other  power  can  will,  or  produce  his 
own  act  of  will,  he  is  also,  in  the  sphere  of  his  moral  nature,  a 
sole  creative  first  cause,  though  still  a  finite  cause.  Other  in- 
telligences may  aid  him  by  imparting  knowledge ;  may  by  word 
of  action  instruct  him  in  the  architecture;  but  the  application 
of  his  knowledge,  the  actual  building,  must  be  by  himself 
alone. "^ 

There  is  much  unanimity  among  thinkers  in  their  treatment 
of  man's  self-conscious  life.  The  self  has  two  "discriminated 
aspects."  It  is  at  once  the  knower  and  the  known.  It  is  both 
subject  and  object.  It  has  the  power  to  hold  itself  at  arms 
length,  as  it  were,  in  order  that  the  self-examination  may 
proceed.  This  ability  of  self-objectification  is  another  dis- 
tinguishing mark  of  the  human  animal.  It  is  perhaps  the 
unique  cachet  of  personality. 

The  fact  of  this  duplexity  in  the  self  is  more  important  than 
its  terminology.  The  Germans  distinguish  between  the 
'empirical  self  and  the  'pure  ego'.  James  brings  out  the  same 
idea  in  his  treatment  of  the  T'  and  the  'me'.  More  recently 
M.  Henri  Bergson,  in  making  a  new  analysis  of  duration,  has 
broken  new  ground  in  this  field. ^  Time  is  a  qualitative  multi- 
plicity, an  absolute  heterogeneity  of  elements  which  inter- 
penetrate one  another.  He  distinguishes  between  the  real  self 
in  pure  duration  and  the  external  projection  of  this  self  in 

''Man  a  Creative  First  Cause,  p  8g.  Vide  also  Freedom  of  Mind 
in  Willing. 

^J.  Ward  claims  to  have  anticipated  by  three  years  Bergson's  con- 
ception that  "there  is  an  element  in  our  concrete  time-perception  which 
has  no  place  in  our  abstract  conception  of  time."  Cf.  The  Realm  of 
Ends,  note,  page  306,  Vide  also  Ency.  Brit.  "Psychology"  nth  Ed., 
P   577. 


THE  NATURE  OF  THE  SELF  53 

spatial  relations.  Since  there  is  no  mutual  externality  in  the 
moments  of  pure  duration,  there  can  be  no  antecedent  and  con- 
sequent, no  cause  and  effect  relations  in  the  activity  of  the 
'timal'  self.  Because  of  the  misconception  of  duration,  and 
thus  also  of  the  self,  the  associationist  psychologists  have  fallen 
into  error.  If  it  is  once  understood  that  psychic  intensity  is 
never  magnitude,  all  talk  of  the  strongest  motive  determining 
the  will  is  meaningless. 

In  this  non-spatial  self  freedom  inheres.  It  is  not  by  a  dis- 
cursive process  but  by  intuitive  insight  and  penetrating  intro- 
spection that  the  essence  of  reality  is  found.  How  then  define 
freedom?  ''It  is  the  relation  of  the  concrete  self  to  the  act 
which  it  performs."  But  what  is  this  relation f  It  is  indefin- 
able just  because  we  are  free.  We  can  only  analyze  and  define 
magnitudes  i.  e.  things  that  have  mutual  externalities  and  that 
have  their  position  in  a  homogeneous  space.  Freedom  is  a 
process  and  if  we  insist  on  a  definition  we  persist  in  making 
"a  process  into  a  thing  and  duration  into  extensity."  Freedom 
cannot  be  defined  without  spatializing  duration  and,  therefore, 
every  attempt  at  definition  unwittingly  leads  to  determinism. 

It  is  a  fair  question  whether  this  analysis  has  any  significant  • 
meaning  for  freedom.    Is  this  indefinable  and  intuitive  freedom  • 
any  more  satisfactory  than  Kant's  freedom,  which  is  so  safely  • 
tucked  away  in  the  inaccessible  noumenal  realm  ?    There  is  this  ♦ 
advantage.    M.  Bergson's  position,  based  on  his  own  theory  of 
knowledge,   shows    that,   while   the    fact   of    freedom   is   not 
amenable  to  the   same   formulation  and  demonstration   as   a 
scientific  fact,  nevertheless  its  certainty  and  reality,  verified  by 
immediate  consciousness,  is  unimpeachable.     His  whole  argu-  • 
ment  substantiates,  what  is  generally  admitted,  that  the  only  • 
infallible  proof  of  freedom  is  the  testimony  of  self-conscious-  • 
ness.    The  validity  of  this  conviction  is  vindicated  not  so  much  • 
by  positive  evidence  as  through  a  negative  process  which  under-  • 
mines  a  vicious  and  fallacious  determinism.     By  showing  how   * 
duration,  intensity,  and  voluntry  determination — purely  psychic    • 
moments — have  been  misinterpreted  by  reason  of  the  intrusion  . 
of  spatial  prejudice,  M.  Bergson  has  made  the  argument  against  • 
a  destructive  determinism  and,  therefore,  in  favor  of  creative 
freedom  well  nigh  conclusive. 

While,  therefore,  the  fundamental  self  is  the  bearer  of  reality 
and  freedom,  it  remains  barren  as  long  as  it  abides  alone.     In 


54  CRITICISM  OF  DETERMINISM 

order  to  realize  itself  and  to  become  fruitful  it  must  be  objecti- 
fied in  space ;  it  must  be  thrown  out  into  the  current  of  social 
life.  In  other  words  it  must  assume  the  common  symbols  of 
extensity.  The  thought  must  be  put  in  words;  the  burning 
conviction  into  vital  oratory.  The  vision  of  beauty  is  restless 
until  it  finds  embodiment  in  some  concrete  form ;  the  spiritual 
impulse  must  manifest  itself  in  worship  and  deeds  of  kindness. 
Here  again  is  found  the  meaning  in  the  economy  of  mechanism. 
The  certainty  and  solidity,  guaranteed  by  the  causal  nexus, 
afford  public  permanency  and  continuity  to  the  ever  changing 
self  as  it  accumulates  the  living  moments  of  concrete  duration. 
The  external  world  is  the  common  denominator  of  selves.  The 
laws  of  nature  are  the  rules  governing  this  great  forum.  If 
the  rules  were  not  strict,  the  game  would  not  be  worth  while.  It 
is  true  that  this  "hard  and  forbidding-looking  mechanism"  is 
the  friend  and  not  the  foe  of  freedom. 

In  this  well-defined  competitive  forum,  where  the  activities 
of  life  take  place,  man  is  more  at  home  than  in  the  inner 
sanctum  from  whence  the  real  issues  of  life  flow.  From  the 
beginning  of  life  the  empirical  self  is  our  habitation.  It  is 
more  exhilarating  to  live  on  the  periphery  than  at  the  center; 
for  there  the  movement  is  rapid  and  the  scenery  panoramic. 

It  is  a  well  attested  principle  in  jurisprudence  that  society 
develops  from  "status  to  contract."  The  family,  the  caste,  the 
tribe  or  the  government  rigorously  determines  the  exact  scope 
and  nature  of  the  social  and  personal  activities  of  the  primitive 
man.  As  the  race  makes  progress  the  individual  is  gradually 
freed  from  the  bonds  of  condition  and  circumstance.  By  con- 
tract he  is  permitted  to  make  his  own  status.  So  also  in  the 
wake  of  civilization  there  is  observed  a  transformation  in  the 
Kultur  Geschichte  of  nations.  Pseudo-science,  superstition, 
and  religion  have  been  clarified  and  vitalized  by  the  rectifying 
power  of  reason.  Society,  i.  e.  the  mass  of  its  members,  has 
been  emancipated  from  the  slavery  of  external  determinants. 

This  philogenetic  process  has  its  ontogenetic  counterpart. 
The  child,  the  primitive  father  of  the  man,  lives  by  the  grace 
of  reflex  arcs,  heredity  and  environment.  Self-consciousness 
awakes  in  the  empirical  realm,  in  the  'me'  and  not  in  the  T'. 
In  this  domain  'other'  determines  the  *me';  the  T'  seldom,  if 
ever,  determines  'other'.  Choice  is  abnormal  and  the  self  not 
free.     The  status  of  selfhood  has  not  yet  been  remade  by  a 


THE  NATURE  OF  THiE^SELF:  -/  {  ;-•.;":"-.-  g^.'-, 

free  contract.  The  business  oi  self-life,  however,  is  to  translate 
the  empirical  into  the  spiritual ;  it  means  the  navigation  of  the 
stream  of  life  to  its  very  source.  All  are  prodigals  living  in 
the  far  country  of  spatial  selfhood.  We  feed  on  the  husks  of 
transient  experience.  The  purpose  of  education,  religion  and 
government  is  to  help  a  man  to  come  to  himself.  This  finding 
process  is  retarded  by  too  many  external  contrivances;  it  is 
accelerated  by  insistence  on  the  dynamic  reality  of  the  inner 
self.  He  who  has  found  his  way  through  the  crust  of  his 
outer  self  to  the  core  of  inner  reality  becomes  a  living  artist. 
The  sphere  may  be  humble  but  it  can  never  again  become 
merely  mechanical.  The  increment  may  be  small,  but  a  unique 
contribution  is  made  to  society.  The  course  of  history  has 
received  a  significant  impetus.  Such  an  individual  makes  the 
world  appreciably  other  than  it  would  have  been  without  his 
existence.  He  is  a  real  creative  genius.  A  quotation  at  this 
point  may  epitomize  the  thought. 

"Freedom  is  therefore  a  fact,  and  among  the  facts  which  we 
observe  there  is  none  clearer.  All  the  difficulties  of  the  prob- 
lem, and  the  problem  itself,  arise  from  the  desire  to  endow 
duration  with  the  same  attributes  as  extensity,  to  interpret  a 
succession  by  a  simultaneity,  and  to  express  the  idea  of  freedom 
in  a  language  into  which  it  is  obviously  untranslatable,  .  .  . 
But  the  moments  at  which  we  thus  grasp  ourselves  are  rare, 
and  that  is  just  why  we  are  rarely  free.  The  greater  part  of 
the  time  we  live  outside  ourselves,  hardly  perceiving  anything 
of  ourselves  but  our  own  ghost,  a  colourless  shadow  which 
pure  duration  projects  into  homogeneous  space.  Hence  our 
life  unfolds  in  space  rather  than  in  time;  we  live  for  the  ex- 
ternal world  rather  than  for  ourselves;  we  speak  rather  than 
think ;  we  'are  acted'  rather  than  act  ourselves.  To  act  freely 
is  to  recover  possession  of  oneself,  and  to  get  back  into  pure 
duration."^ 

If  the  above  delineation  reveals  the  true  nature  of  the 
^many',  it  may  be  asked,  what  has  become  of  the  'One'  ?  Has 
not  the  Infinite  been  impeached?  The  answer  of  course  is,  no. 
It  must  be  admitted,  however,  that  in  finding  the  'One'  z'ia  the 
'many',  our  conception  of  the  Infinite  is  different  from  what  it 
would  be  if  the  process  had  been  reversed.  God  in  creating 
selves  on  whom  He  has  bestowed  some  creative  causation,  has 
in  a  sense  limited  Himself.    But  it  is  a  self -limitation  and  this 

•H.  Bergson,  Time  and  Free  Will,  pp.  221,  231. 


^:56^^^^^)^f  "^  '^  't  tCRI^AQSM  OF  DETERMINISM 

clearly  implies  that  He  is  never  circumscribed  by  any  thing 
external  to  Himself.  He  does  not  fractionate  Himself  into 
Hjs  world.  The  relation  between  Creator  and  creature  is  never 
subtractive.  Some  of^the,  future  volitions  of _fr£.e„a^ents  are^ 
not  the  subjecT^rknowledge  and,  therefore,  omniscience  does 
riot  apply  to  them.  And  still  God  rules,  the-AVorld,-  and  carries! 
His  plan  to  its  culmination^  Thg^  total  possibilities  are^xed 
.BuFthev  are  always  in  excess  of  the  actualities.  This  gives  a 
limitpjj^but  a  real  scope  for  human  imtiativp  and  freedom. 
Each_has  some  talent  and  some  creative  opportunity.  Each 
may  hinder  or  help  the"prairt>f-GDd:,"THough  none'^ls  sufficient 
power  wholly  to  thwart  His  final  purpose. 

"Foreknowledge  of  the  contingent,"  says  Martineau,  "is  not 
a  perfection,  and  if,  rather  than  have  a  reign  of  universal  neces- 
sity and  stereotyped  futurity,  He  willed,  in  order  to  prepare 
scope  for  a  gift  of  moral  freedom,  to  set  up  a  range  of  alterna- 
tive possibilities.  He  could  but  render  some  knowledge  condi- 
tional for  the  sake  of  making  any  righteousness  attainable; 
leaving  enough  that  is  determinate  for  science;  and  enough 
that  is  indeterminate,  for  character."^^ 

With  this  conception  of  selfhood  it  is  also  significant  to 
observe  that  the  enigma  of  sin  becomes  rationally  explicable. 
Finitude  means  frailty,  and  thus  the  possibility  of  evil.  Though 
in  an  infinitely  good  God  sin  is  inconceivable,  it  is  entirely 
compatible  with  the  existence  of  a  finite  creature.  Evil  as  a 
misuse  of  talents,  given  to  a  free  moral  agent,  violates  neither 
the  perfection  nor  the  omnipotence  of  the  Deity. 

In  the  criticism  of  theological  determinism  it  was  submitted 
that  the  ought,  which  is  indispensable  to  Christian  ethics, 
could  not  be  grounded  in  a  strictly  "closed  universe."  No 
matter  what  the  obligatory  ideal  may  be,  to  say  that  I  ought 
to  conform,  presupposes  ability  to  do  so.  What  ought  to  be 
can  be.  The  demand  of  oughtness  is  firmly  grounded  in  the 
new  conception  of  selfhood  because  the  self  can  creatively 
respond  to  the  lure  of  an  ethical  ideal.  Each  self  contains  the 
potentialities  of  many  characters — good,  bad,  and  indifferent. 
The  soul  is  full,  as  James  has  it,  of  "simultaneous  possibilities." 
The  imperative  voice  is  a  challenge  to  actualize  only  the  best. 
And  this  challenge  is  not  mockery  because  each  self  has  some 
unique  responsive  power. 

"^  study  of  Religion,  Vol.  II,  p.  279. 


VI— CONCLUSION 

The  ultimate  purpose  of  our  study  has  been  to  find  a  basic 
principle  for  the  solution  of  the  many  practical  problems  which 
confront  the  thoughtful  student  of  modern  life.  The  transi- 
tional character  of  the  present  age  makes  the  need  of  such  a 
principle  doubly  imperative.  The  reconstruction  of  social  in- 
stitutions is  the  demand  of  the  hour.  Shall  the  work  proceed 
in  the  direction  of  individualism  or  paternalism? 

The  true  answer  can  be  given  only  if  we  have  a  true  know- 
ledge of  the  nature  of  the  individual  selves  which  constitute  the 
social  groups.  /Science  and  deterministic  theology,  by  inter- 
preting the  self  as  an  entity  directly  or  indirectly  deter- 
mined by  'other/  paralyze  initiation  and  place  a  high 
premium  on  collectivistic  methods.  The  one  makes  the  self 
the  organized  resultant  of  physical  moments;  the  other  makes 
it  the  product  of  physical  plus  spiritual  moments.  In  both 
cases  the  self  has  no  inherent  creative  possibilities.  Ultimately 
all  is  given  and  determined  by  external  influence,  Evtdeft€e- 
has  been  addno^,  however,  to-&bew^-thart  these  two  prevailing 
schools  misrepresent  the  real  nature  of  the  self.  The  individual 
is  more  than  the  sum  of  all  external  contributions.^  These 
increments  largely  condition  the  operations  of  the  self  but 
they  are  never  the  sole  ground  of  its  distinctive  activities/The 
vis  which  constructs  the  mental  and  moral  life  of  the  individual 
is  not  entirely  traceable  to  antecedents;  for  each  self  is  sui 
generis,  and  is  itself  the  ultimate  ground  of  its  real  emanations. 
Talents,  position,  and  opportunity  vary  greatly  among  men; 
but  each  has  power  to  recreate  his  environment  and  to  create 
out  of  the  plastic  element  of  his  nature  a  finished  piece  of 
reality. 

This  conception  of  the  self  becomes  our  guiding  principle. 
It  will  guard  against  a  chaotic  individualism  as  well  as  a 
petrifying  paternalism.  The  pure  Ego  remains  barren  until  it 
is  projected  into  spatial  and  social  relations.  This  objectifying 
process  is  helped  or  hindered  by  the  conditions  which  obtain  in 
the  body  politic.    Increased  restrictions  are  sanctioned  as  long 

57 


/'SS'-^'t/^^  >  •[  'iZR^TlClSM  OF  DETERMINISM 

as  they  tend  to  enhance  individual  freedom.    The  real  purpose 

of  restraint  is  to  permit  the  individual  to  realize  both  his  social 

#and  super-social  possibilities.     The  church  and  the  school  can 

♦  hasten  the  realization  of  this  ideal  by  proclaiming  the  Gospel 

%0F  Creative  Selfhood. 


->•    »f:l-* 


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(A9562sl0)476B 


General  Librarr 
UoiTerritr  of  California 

Berkeley 


"W 


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